The effect of MBOs on Companies Performance and Capital Structure by Novaki, Evgenia & Petrakopoulou, Styliani
  
Master of Science in Banking and Finance 
 
 
 
Dissertation Title: 
“The effect of MBOs on Companies Performance 
and Capital Structure” 
 
 
 
Novaki Evgenia 
Student ID: 1103100034 
 
Petrakopoulou Styliani 
Student ID: 110310028 
 
 
 
 
September 2010 
2 
 
Abstract  
 
This study provides an analysis of the changes in performance for a sample of 70 
management buyouts (MBOs) of public companies that took place between 1997 and 2007, 
worldwide. Data for three years pre and post MBO were used to detect differences in 
profitability, performance, efficiency, liquidity, leverage and investment that occur due to 
the MBO transaction. The evidence suggests that companies do not experience greater 
profitability and efficiency in the post MBO period and do not improve their liquidity 
position. Leverage, on the other hand, increases and investment ratios give no evidence of 
expansion. These findings suggest that the overall performance of companies after the 
buyout does not improve. 
Keywords: MBOs, LBOs, performance, capital structure 
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction 
The 1980s witnessed rapid growth in corporate restructuring activities and in particular of 
buyouts which became a significant organizational form (Wright et al., 1994). According to 
Robbie et al. (1991) this activity has involved three main trends:  
 The re-allocation of activities among and within firms that involved divestments 
and peripheral business activities, takeovers and leveraged buyouts. 
 The substitution of debt for equity in the firm‟s capital structure, and  
 The increase in performance-related compensation for employees and management. 
In any case, the form of corporate restructuring depends strongly on the characteristics 
of the particular economy in which it takes place. This is the reason why in the U.S.A, 
where there is a developed bond market, leveraged buyouts (LBOs) grew, mainly facilitated 
by the use of „junk bonds‟, whereas in Europe where companies depend on bank finance 
MBOs are more common. 
A leveraged buyout involves an acquisition of a company by a specialized investment 
institution using a relatively large amount of outside debt financing. LBOs surged in the 
1980‟s, but a few years later, the junk bond market collapsed and as a result many LBOs 
defaulted and declared bankruptcy (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008). Moreover, in the latter 
half of 1980 opportunities dried up and gains coming from leveraged buyouts could be 
easily achieved through simpler ways, like increases in leverage (Opler, 1992).  
Consequently, LBOs of public companies disappeared by the early 1990‟s and these 
transactions were rare since early 2000‟s. During the mid-2000‟s leveraged buyouts 
reappeared and in 2006-2007 the amount of capital committed to private equity reached a 
peak; however in 2008 the turmoil in the debt markets brought this amount to decline 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008). 
According to Singh (1990) management buyouts (MBOs) are transactions in which the 
management team, in conjunction with an investor group, buys the firm from its 
public stockholders using a high level of debt to finance the transaction. A buyout can be 
thought of as a substitution of common stock with debt. The high level of debt is made 
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acceptable to the lenders by using the firm‟s assets as collateral and the cash flow from the 
operations of the firm to pay off the loans over time. Under this term we could view MBO 
as a sub-category of an LBO, were a team of incumbent managers buy a substantial equity 
stake.  
Another characteristic worth mentioning is the presence of private equity firms that are 
usually the providers of debt (Robbie et al., 1991) as well as the presence of other investors 
in cases where only a significant or controlling stake is acquired by managers. Therefore, 
we do not always expect for an MBO to be a Public to Private transaction (PTP) as 
companies can also remain public. 
The market for MΒΟs consists of three key players: companies willing to sell, 
management teams willing to buy and a variety of institutional participants willing to fund 
the transactions, such as local clearing banks, venture capitalists and large specialist debt 
and equity providing closed-end funds (Weir, 1996; Wright et al., 1992).  
 Weir (1996) has classified management buyouts in five categories, according to the 
reason that motivated a buyout to occur: 
 Buyouts from independent companies in receivership.  
 Buyouts from parent companies in receivership. 
 Buyouts from parent companies by means of divestment.  
 Buyouts as a result of the retirement of the owner. 
 Buyouts as part of the privatization process.  
Many early empirical studies, like those by Smith (1990) and Kaplan (1989)  have 
focused on buyouts and have indicated that they contribute in reducing agency costs, 
tightening governance structures and overall creating value for the stakeholders. Several 
theories support this view: 
Jensen (1986) argues that buyouts increase managerial equity holding and this provides 
managers strong incentives to monitor the company‟s activities  and to generate cash flows 
in order to service debt payments, otherwise the company would face bankruptcy. The 
reduced agency costs and the new incentives  aid in limiting the waste of free cash flow that 
was previously in the discretion of managers. Moreover, Shleifer and Summers (1980) 
support that buyouts and takeovers increase operating income through employee lay-off 
and wage reductions. Lowenstein (1985) suggest that managers buy firm control because 
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they have information that the firm is undervalued by the market, thus they offer a small 
premium and the company produces higher cash flows than expected. Moreover, in a 
buyout equity is largely substituted with debt. The service of high debt payments provides 
tax savings and, therefore, increased cash flows. Robbie et al. (1991) adds that the 
institutions which provide debt and the buyout specialists that hold large positions provide 
additional source of close monitoring. 
The recent resurgence of leveraged buyouts internationally has raised once again the 
concern about their effects and as Axelson et al. (2009) mention in their recent study it is 
important to understand buyouts not only because of the number and money value of 
transactions, but also because they can teach us much about corporate finance.  
This study attempts to analyse the performance of 70 management buyouts completed 
between 1997 and 2007 worldwide. Our main hypothesis is whether MBOs still experience 
an improved performance and efficiency in the post MBO period. Following the 
methodology used in previous studies (e.g. Smith, 1990; Opler, 1992; Cao, 2010) we 
measure the impact of MBOs on firm performance, using 6 years of data, three years prior 
and three years after the MBO transaction. The variables employed to measure overall 
performance fall into the following categories: a) profitability, performance and efficiency, 
b) liquidity, c) leverage and solvency and d) investment. 
We believe that our study contributes to the pertinent literature in several ways. 
First, it fills the gap of past research on post-MBO performance since most studies focus on 
buyouts that occurred during the 80‟s. Second, it offers a more complete view of the post 
buyout performance by analyzing a large number of variables and a worldwide sample of 
companies. Finally, it employs data around the world and not from a specific geographical 
region. 
The study is structured as follows. The next chapter reviews existing literature and 
explains MBOs‟ sources of value. Chapter 3 describes the methodology employed and the 
selected measures, while chapter 4 analyses the sample design, data collection and the 
descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 reports the results and the findings discussion. Finally, 
chapter 6 presents the conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 
 
2. Literature Review 
A management buyout (MBO) is a special leverage buyout (LBO) transaction, which 
involves the acquisition of a business by its management group from its existing public 
shareholders, using high leverage to fund the deal usually in conjunction with outside 
financiers and investors, such as private equity institutions. MBOs may vary in size, scope 
and complexity; however, the key characteristic is that managers buy a substantial if not a 
controlling or the majority interest in the company (CMBOR Glossary, 2010; Singh, 1990; 
Wright et al., 1995). Wright et al. (1989) and Frankfurter and Gunay (1993) mention that 
the majority of buyouts take place in mature companies with expected stable cash flows, 
but insufficient chances for growth. Studies by Grammatikos and Swary (1986) and Lehn et 
al. (1990) have shown that these firms have lower sales and employment growth, larger 
available spare free cash flows, lower market-to-book ratios and lower stock returns than 
comparable firms in the same industry. The level of debt in an MBO firm may be as high as 
90% of the total capitalization. The post buyout governance structure is totally different 
from the pre buyout structure, as the new firm has smaller board that represents better 
investors and managers (Singh, 1990). 
Management buyouts are almost as old as capitalism. However until late 1970‟s 
such buyouts were rare and involved mainly private companies due to legal restraints, lack 
of financing availability and techniques, and managers‟ unwillingness to proceed to MBOs 
(Wright et al., 1989).  MBOs surged in the 1980‟s, possibly due to the fact that at that time 
it was easy to find undervalued firms (Weir et al., 2008; Phan and Hill, 1995). This rapid 
growth of the MBOs had drawn the attention of the academia to the issue of whether 
MBOs, that took place mainly in the USA and UK from early „80s, generated profits to the 
firms and whether these profits existed in the short or long term (Wright et al., 1995). 
However, the collapse of the junk bond market a few years later had resulted in the 
disappearance of the LBOs of public companies by the early 1990‟s. The second wave of 
LBO‟s that started during mid 2000‟s motivated researchers to answer the question whether 
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post 1980‟s deals have the same positive performance as the first wave (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2008).  
There are three main theories that explain the sources of value that induce MBOs 
activity; the increased incentives argument, the managerial opportunism argument and the 
tax savings argument. 
The increased incentives theory alleges that firms that have undergone a 
management buyout perform better in the post buyout period due to changes in asset 
management (Singh, 1990). Specifically, the agency theory suggests that within public 
companies there are conflicts between the interests of managers and shareholders, and that 
companies before the leverage buyout are run inefficiently and wastefully. According to 
Jensen (1986) a serious source of conflict is the utilization of the free cash flow, that is, the 
cash flow in excess of that required to finance the investment projects with positive net 
present value. He also argues that since this cash flow cannot be profitably invested it 
should be returned to shareholders; however, management teams may refuse to do so and 
instead pursue discretionary policies by investing the free cash flow in projects with low or 
negative net present value (Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007). 
There are numerous mechanisms that can reduce these agency conflicts, such as 
board of directors, concentrated ownership, stock option plans and golden parachutes, 
nevertheless they are not always sufficient. On the other hand, LBOs and especially MBOs 
give managers additional and greater incentives to run their companies efficiently as 
leverage pressures them not to waste money because they have to service high principal and 
interest payments and both their job and personal wealth are at stake (Phan and Hill, 1995). 
This view is also supported by Kaplan (1989) who believes that the reorganization that 
typically takes place after the buyout includes measures that reduce the agency conflicts 
and costs. The result is that the free cash flow is decreased, but at the same time the 
increased debt can force managers to be risk averse, making risk-free investment policies to 
avoid financial distress or bankruptcy (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008; Holthausen and 
Larker, 1996). In contrast, Berg and Gottschalg (2004) argue that the reduction of agency 
conflicts has no direct effect on operating performance, but it can ease strategic and 
operational improvements.  
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In summary, the increased equity holdings of firm‟s managers, that directly affect 
their efficiency and their wages, the existence of major investors and financial institutions 
which seek to protect their interest through placing members in the company‟s board of 
directors and frequent financial statements, result in a tighter monitoring system of 
manager‟s decisions and actions. The significant changes in the firm‟s ownership structure, 
capital structure and strategies, combined with a reinforcement of monitoring is expected to 
boost the firm‟s operating performance and efficiency (Wright et al., 1994; Smith, 1990; 
Phan and Hill, 1995). 
Critics of MBOs, however, assert that the typical nominal premium of 40 percent 
paid in an MBO deal, is too large to be regained by the management team having the same 
assets. As MBO is not a typical acquisition, there are no synergies to exploit, and so critics 
cast doubt on the managers‟ ability to create radical changes in operating performance and 
efficiency. Also, they believe that it is unlikely that the same management team in the post 
buyout period would be able to employ dramatically different philosophies and strategies in 
order to recover the loss (Singh, 1990). 
The managerial opportunism theory and the information asymmetry theory assert 
that managers acquire the firm based on the private information concerning an increase in 
future cash flows when the firm is significantly undervalued by its outside investors. 
Frankfurter and Gunay (1993) mention that it is a general truth that insiders tend to satisfy 
self-interest and this combined with the fact that outsiders cannot monitor closely the 
management‟s actions creates a moral hazard problem. Lowenstein (1985) believes that 
managers manipulate accounting earnings in order to depress the stock price in the pre 
buyout period and so pay an unfairly smaller price to outside shareholders. The 
management group has profits when the premium paid for the buyout is lower than the 
difference between the purchase price and the company‟s intrinsic value. This gain is 
realized via a public offering a few years after the management buyout (Singh, 1990; 
Smith, 1990). 
 The difference between the increased incentives theory and the managerial 
opportunism theory is that in the first theory the gains come from managerial intervention, 
while in the other case the gains would have occurred without the buyout and are realized 
through timely buyout and public offering strategies (Ofek, 1994).  
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The main criticism concerning this theory is that managers have to manipulate and 
especially understate systematically and persistently the company‟s financial statements; 
however, public companies are forced to disclose critical information in a regular base, so 
the feasibility of this argument is in question. Secondly, when MBOs take place due to an 
apparent takeover threat and buyout proposals from outsiders, there is little chance that 
managers are motivated by private information about future cash flows. Finally, if a firm is 
undervalued other bidders can force incumbent management to raise its bid resulting in 
losing most of the gains (Singh, 1990). 
There is little empirical support for the hypothesis that managers attempt to depress 
stock prices by understating earnings and forecasts before buyouts. DeAngelo (1986) finds 
no evidence of such an action. Kaplan (1989) asserts that management actually tends to 
overstate forecasted earnings. He also shows that that many managers that have significant 
equity holdings decide not to agree in the buyout and accept to receive the same premiums 
as the rest of the shareholders. If the premiums were low, they would not have agreed to 
receive them but they would take part in the buyout actively. On the other hand, Wu (1997) 
presents evidence of manipulation in firm‟s earnings in 87 management buyouts during the 
period 1980-1987 and supports the argument that managers understate earnings before 
submitting the buyout proposal. 
Furthermore, Marais et al. (1989) and Smith (1990) find evidence that when an 
MBO proposal is submitted, the stock price of the firm increases; however, if the proposal 
fails to be executed, as a result of board or stockholder rejection, withdrawal or higher 
outside bid, the stock price falls, showing that expectations are that the firm will not 
experience increased earnings anyway as the private information theory suggests. In 
addition, Ofek (1994) studies leveraged buyouts that failed to be completed due to fact that 
the proposals were rejected by the board of directors or stockholders and detects no excess 
stock returns or operating improvements for these companies. 
 Smith (1990) states that the post-buyout corporate reports and statements provide 
little qualitative evidence that managers privately expect better figures and in contrast they 
disclose at least one restructuring activity (cost cutting  programs, tightening of inventory 
and receivable controls, reorganization of manufacturing facilities, redeployment of assets 
etc) as Muscarella and Vetsuypens‟ research (1988) ascertains. She also shows that where 
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MBOs fail to be completed, operating returns do not increase the subsequent year of the 
proposal.  
The last theory that explains the source of value of MBOs is suggested by 
Lowenstein (1985). According to him, the strongest incentive for managers to proceed to 
buyouts is the big tax benefits created by the high levels of debt used to finance the buyout. 
The interest payments made to service the new debt are huge, but also are tax deductible, so 
there is an increase in cash flows, which can cover the premium paid for the buyout to be 
completed. In fact, Frankfurter and Gunay (1993) support this argument by finding that the 
major driving force behind MBOs is the tax shields generated by the debt used to fund the 
buyout; however, they argue that management teams also anticipate real economic gains 
from the buyout. Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) also mention the significant tax benefits of 
the high leverage that MBO transactions require. 
 The wide interest concerning the post buyout effect of these transactions on 
companies stimulated a lot of research trying to find out whether the increased incentives 
argument could be really supported by empirical results. The literature can be divided in 
two periods relative to the two waves of LBOs: the first wave concerning LBOs taken place 
during 1980‟s and the second one concerning post 1980‟s LBOs and especially LBOs after 
their reappearance in mid 2000‟s.  
Early studies based both on share price (e.g. Kaplan, 1989; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; 
Marais et al. 1989) and accounting data (e.g. Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990; Smart and 
Waldfogel, 1994), generally show that MBOs actually improve companies‟ financial 
performance.   
Kaplan (1989) and Kaplan and Stein (1993) suggest that companies which have 
undergone a buyout experience enhanced operating profits and few defaults, and that the 
buyout sponsors earned great returns due to the stock market expansion during that time. 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) study firms taken private in management buyouts and find 
that both financial and real performance measures, improve after the buyout. Moreover, 
Smith (1990) and Wright et al. (1996) have investigated changes in operating performance, 
financial performance and productivity of management buyouts of public companies and 
found that the overall performance of companies increased significantly from the year 
before to the year after the buyout. Palepu (1990), Singh (1990), Opler (1992), Seth and 
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Easterwood (1993), Smart and Waldfogel (1994) and Zahra (1995) also argue that the 
operating performance improves in the post buyout period, while Rappaport (1990) 
believes that a firm that has undergone a management buyout lacks the flexibility of a firm 
financed by publicly traded equity and that once the performance-enhancing changes have 
been achieved, the firm will return to its previous growth path, albeit at an improved 
position. 
On the other hand, Long and Ravenscraft (1991) find that operating profit margins 
declined by an average 2% in the post buyout period for 107 LBOs during the period 1985-
1987. This suggests that the dramatic improvements documented in earlier LBOs were due 
to unusual abundance of attractive LBO targets and that “the number and type of firms that 
can be revitalized through LBOs is limited”.  
Some researchers, like Reich (1989) and Long and Ravenscraft (1993), have argued 
that the high level of leverage associated with a buyout forces companies to reduce needed 
capital and R&D investments to pay off the debt and thus they hurt their long run 
performance, profitability and competitive position. Opler (1992) studies 44 LBOs 
completed between 1985 and 1989 and finds significant increase in operating and net cash 
flows and decline in capital expenditures, income taxes and R&D expenses following the 
completion of the LBOs. Phan and Hill (1995) suggest that LBOs performance improves 
immediately after the transaction, but afterwards it declines. 
The second wave of leveraged buyouts and especially those taken place during 
2001-2007 has motivated researchers to study whether buyouts are still generating value. 
According to Cao and Lerner (2009) the buyout market is nowadays characterized by “far 
larger than it was during the years when it enjoyed its greatest returns” and they continue 
mentioning that the returns from buyouts have deteriorated. 
Desbrierers and Schatt (2002) use a sample of 161 MBO that took place in France 
during 1988-1994 and conclude that the firms undergone an MBO outperformed the 
comparable firms in the same industry both before and after the transaction. On the other 
hand, they find that their performance declines after the deal is completed, unlike the 
findings relating to UK and US LBOs. Evans et al. (2005) find that firms that go private 
have higher liquidity, lower growth rates, lower leverage pre-buyout and lower R&D. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) suggest the reduced capital expenditures in the post buyout 
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period that studies have shown, may mean that LBOs might increase current cash flows, but 
hurt future cash flows.  
Harris et al. (2005) and Bergström et al. (2007) studied UK and Swedish buyouts, 
respectively. Their results are consistent with the US studies in 1980‟s as they conclude that 
LBOs enhance significantly the operating performance and the productivity. Cumming et 
al. (2007) conclude that the recent research on buyout performance shows that 
corporations‟ returns are significantly higher due to the existence of active private equity 
investors that monitor managers better and the higher debt service obligations. They also 
mention that there is a general consensus that across different methodologies, measures and 
time periods, LBOs and especially MBOs boost performance and have a prominent impact 
on work practices.  
However, there are some exceptions to the literature. Researchers have studied more 
recent transactions and have found modest increases in operating results. For example, Guo 
et al. (2009) study 94 LBOs with available post-buyout data completed from 1990 to 2005 
and find modest increases in operating and cash flow margins. Also, Acharya and Kehoe 
(2008) find similar results for UK buyouts that took place approximately the same period. 
Weir et al. (2008) after studying 122 buyouts in the UK during 1998-2004 conclude that 
performance deteriorates relative to the pre-buyout situation, but there is evidence that 
firms do not perform worse than firms that remain public and some evidence that 
performance improves. Furthermore, Leslie and Oyer (2008) study US LBO‟s during 1996-
2004 and find weak or generally no evidence of greater profitability or operating efficiency 
compared to public companies. These studies can make us to conclude that the post 1980‟s 
leveraged buyouts may be different from those of the early 1980‟s. 
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Chapter 3   
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Methodology Description 
The current study examines the impact of MBO‟s on companies‟ performance and 
efficiency in the years surrounding the completion of the transaction. Our main hypothesis 
is whether MBOs improve companies‟ performance and efficiency.  For our purpose, we 
opt for analysing 45 ratios and indices to capture possible changes in the companies‟ 
performance, profitability, efficiency, liquidity, leverage (capital structure) and solvency, 
dividend policy and market price. 
These employed financial variables (i.e. ratios, and fundamentals) are based on the 
existing literature and cover a wide range of ratios in order to give us an overall view of the 
company performance subject to data availability. Specifically, a number of the variables 
used are based on the literature of management buyouts, leveraged buyouts, public to 
private transactions, reversed leveraged buyouts, etc., while other variables are based on 
accounting books, described as widely used important variables. The 45 variables are 
classified under five broad categories and are presented below. 
The first category includes ratios, indices and fundamentals that capture the 
performance, profitability and efficiency of the sample companies. These three elements 
are the primary measures of a company‟s overall success. Profitability in particular is 
necessary for a company‟s survival (Short and Libby, 2007). There are several widely used 
measures for performance, profitability and efficiency. In this study we have selected  to 
employ sixteen variables: Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Return on 
Capital (ROC), Operating Cash Flow to Sales (CFO/Sales), Return on Capital Employed 
(ROCE), Asset Turnover, Profit Margin, Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), 
Earnings Before Interest Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA), EBITDA to 
Sales (EBITDA margin), Capital Expenditures (CAPEX), Capital Expenditures to Assets 
(CAPEX/Assets), Sales Growth, Capital Expenditures to Sales (CAPEX/Sales) and 
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Enterprise Value. Finally, we use R&D Expenditures to Sales ratio that is also assumed to 
capture future growth possibility. 
Liquidity refers to a company‟s ability to meet its current obligations. The majority 
of liquidity tests focus on the relationship between current assets and liabilities. The ability 
to pay current indebtedness is an important factor in evaluating a company‟s short term 
financial strength. If a company does not have available cash it can lose its cash discounts 
and even its credit from its suppliers (Short and Libby, 2007). We measure liquidity using 
eight variables: Quick Ratio, Current Ratio, Inventory to Cash Days, Accounts Payable 
Turnover Days, Cash Ratio, Working Capital Ratio, Cash and Cash Equivalents to Current 
Assets and Cash to Total Assets. 
Leverage shows the capital structure of a company. A company with significantly 
more debt than equity is considered to be highly leveraged. Solvency refers to a company‟s 
ability to meet its long term liabilities (Short and Libby, 2007). If a company is not able to 
pay its long term obligations, it faces the danger of bankruptcy. Leverage and solvency are 
measured by means of nine variables: Gearing Ratio, Total Debt to Assets, Long Term 
Debt to Assets, Long Term Debt to Total Capital, Total Debt to Total Capital, Total Debt to 
Equity, Total Debt and EBIT or EBITDA to Total Interest Expense (Interest Coverage 
Ratios). 
Additionally, we analyse a set of investment variables. A company‟s dividend 
policy and the market price are highly related with future growth and expansion.  In order 
to measure dividend policy, we selected four indicators, Dividends Paid (DVD Paid), 
Dividend Yield, Dividend Payout Ratio and Cash Dividend Coverage, whereas we use 
Price to Book Ratio to measure market value.  
Finally, we employ seven fundamental variables as key indicators to detect the 
overall trend in the company‟s performance, although we don‟t test these results for 
statistical significance. These variables are: Net Income, Total and Current Assets, Cash 
and Near Cash Items, Total Common Equity, Current and Total Liabilities. Table 5 presents 
the variables‟ definition and calculation. Table 6 provides the sources for the variables 
employed. 
 Following Healy and Palepu (1998), DeAngelo (1988), Kaplan (1989), Smith 
(1990), Opler (1992), Ofek (1994) and Cao (2010) we use a  similar methodology to assess 
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MBOs performance, using 6 years of data,  three years of pre- and three years of post-
buyout data, therefore 5 periods, from t-3 to t-1, from t-2 to t-1, from t-1 to t+1, from t-1 to 
t+2 and from t-1 to t+3, where year t stands for the completion year of MBOs (year 0), 
which differs only in few cases from the announcement year. Similar to Kaplan (1989), we 
do not include in our analysis the results for year 0, the fiscal year that the MBO occurs, 
because they are not easy to interpret as pre- or post-buyout data. Moreover, the operating 
income in year 0 is understated due to buyout-related fees and inventory write-ups (Kaplan, 
1989). 
First, we search for differences in the pre buyout figures over the (-3,-1) and (-2,-1) 
windows. These changes provide a basis for evaluating whether the post buyout changes 
can be attributed to the management buyouts, or they are just a continuation of previous 
trends (Smith, 1990). The changes after the buyouts are measured from year -1, that is, the 
fiscal year before the buyout is completed. The changes in year +1 represent the change in 
measures from year -1 to the first available post-buyout observation, which is the fiscal 
year immediately following the MBO. Consequently, the differences in years +2 and +3 
represent the change from year -1 to the second and third fiscal years, respectively.  
We use the method of raw differences (Δxi=x2i-x1i), that is, the observed changes in the 
variables without any adjustment (e.g. for industry performance), in order to capture the 
total change caused by the management buyout on the variables under study (Bergström, 
2007; Acharya, 2010)  
Both differences in means and medians are investigated between periods because we 
wish to exclude the possibility that outliers will dominate the means in the small sample 
analyzed. In this way we are able to compare companies‟ average and median pre and post 
buyout performance and efficiency. The statistical testing of the results leads to rejecting or 
accepting the null hypothesis of equal means and medians across periods. The statistical 
tests used for this procedure are the two-tailed t test for paired two samples for means and 
the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for medians using the Ms Excel and Eviews software. 
This approach is conservative since the results would be more significant if one –tailed tests 
were applied instead (Kaplan, 1989). 
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3.2. Limitations of Methodology 
Our methodology presents three main limitations. First, the firm may not be the appropriate 
level of analysis, if the majority of the transactions take place below the corporation unit, 
such as divestments of subsidiary or department. However, in our sample there are only few 
such transactions. In addition, the analysis of firms‟ financial performance based on 
accounting data could be also problematic, since accounting profits are subject to 
managerial manipulation and they are not perfectly correlated with real performance 
(Cumming et al., 2007). Nonetheless, as it is already mentioned in section 2, there is little 
evidence that managers understate accounting figures. Finally, the raw differences model 
may overstate the effect of the reorganization, since it attributes the entire change in 
performance to the reorganization even though some portion of the change at the firm 
would have occurred in the absence of any reorganization (Smart and Waldfogel, 1994). 
This problem could be overcome by following another method such as the difference in 
differences as the majority of the pertinent literature proposes, or the difference of surprises 
as suggested by Smart and Waldfogel (1994). 
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Chapter 4   
 
4. Sample Selection 
4.1. Sample Description 
The empirical work in this study is conducted using a worldwide sample of MBOs that took 
place between 1997 and 2007. We examined the aforementioned period for two main 
reasons. First, we wish to form a sample of recent MBOs and second to create an 
appropriate window for calculating changes. We extracted data for MBOs from Bloomberg 
database. We applied certain criteria to Bloomberg database in order to derive the  initial 
sample: 
1. Country : Worldwide 
2. Dates : 01/01/1997 until 31/12/2007 (Applied to Completion Date) 
3. Deal Status : Completed 
4. Deal Type : Management Buyout 
5. Company Status Before Deal : Public (Applied to both Target and Acquirer) 
Initially, we identified 376 management buyouts that satisfy the above criteria. This 
sample was then checked for pre and post buyout data availability. The years of data 
required to make our comparisons are three years of pre and three years of post buyout 
data, totally 6 years. Then, we formed 5 windows, from t-3 to t-1, from t-2 to t-1, from t-1 
to t+1, from t-1to t+2 and from t-1 to t+3. 
In order to obtain the pre and post buyout data for the 45 performance variables based 
on accounting data, we created a portfolio with the 376 companies and downloaded the 
historical values for the event periods. All data were estimated in Euros (€) and refer to the 
end of the year. 
After screening the initial sample, we excluded 306 deals due to data unavailability. 
The reason for excluding such a large number of MBOs is attributed to the new status of 
the company, as there are typically minimum disclose requirements if a company goes 
private after a 100% acquisition and to changes in firm‟s name after the buyout that make it 
difficult to track the company. As Cumming et al. (2007) mention there is little publicly 
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available information and data about firms after the MBO transaction, even in the case of a 
full-firm management buyout concerning a publicly traded company. Table 7 presents the 
final list of buyouts used in this study, Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for size, 
premium and leverage and Table 8 reports descriptive statistics for five key fundamentals 
throughout the full event (-3, +3) period.  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
For size, premium and leverage for the final sample of 70 management buyouts 
(Euros in millions) 
Variable  
 
Mean  Median  Max. Min. St. Dev N 
Book value of total assets1  
 
17,486.3 1,057.7 329,253 0.065 55,165 70 
Book value of total common equity1  
 
5,401.1 293.2 131,516 -255.7 17,474 70 
Book value of debt1  
 
11,776.7 482.1 275,409 0.13 42,744 70 
Final premium2  
 
113% 0.81% 1,696% -56% 3.55 27 
Announced total value2  
 
1,438.6 38.1 21,528 0.06 4,020 57 
1
data obtained from year -1. 
2
data obtained from year 0. 
 
Size is measured with book value of total assets, total common equity and announced 
total value. Leverage is measured with total liabilities at the end of the year. The median 
announced total value at the time of the buyout for 57 companies for is €1458, 6 million. 
The largest target company comes from the US industry of energy with total announced 
value of €21527, 5 million. Shareholders of target companies received a median final 
premium of 0.81% (data available for 27 companies) with the largest final premium to be 
1696.36 % for an industrial company based on South Korea. 
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Table 2 and Table 9 report the distribution of the final sample between regions and 
countries. 
Table 2 Final Sample per Region 
Target Region Number of firms 
Europe 15 
Asia 28 
North America 22 
South America 1 
Africa 2 
Oceania 2 
Total 70 
 
 In Asia, we find 40% of the final deals, with Japan, Singapore and South Korea to be 
the target countries for most deals. North America and mainly U.S., represent 30% of the 
final deals. Europe attracts 20% of the deals, which are more common in Germany, UK and 
Poland. The rest of the world counts for only 7% of the deals of the final sample. 
 
4.2. Potential Sample Selection Biases 
The sample selection procedure may introduce biases in the final results in a number of 
ways. We present some summary information and statistics and examine the extent at 
which the final sample fairly represents the initial one. 
Although the final sample, concerning the distribution of deals over time, matches 
the initial sample at some extent, some differences do exist. Table 3 summarizes the 
distribution of the sample by year of completion. Only 1 buyout has been completed before 
2000 in the initial sample. We can see that activity in the market begins no earlier than 
2000, and since then, the number of buyouts increases dramatically.  
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Table 3 Number of Completed MBOs per Year 
For The Initial Sample of 376 Buyouts of Public Companies and For The Final 
Sample of 70 Buyouts with Available Post-Buyout Data, Completed Between 
1997 and 2007 
 
Almost 80% of the MBOs in the initial sample occurred between 2003 and 2007, 
and half of the deals took place especially in 2003 and 2007. In the final sample almost 
87% of the deals occurred in the period between 2003 and 2007, and 65% of the deals in 
2006 and 2007. It should be noted that all industries identified in the initial sample are also 
represented in the final sample. We observe that the majority of deals took place in 2007 
for both initial and final samples. This distribution actually follows the pattern that Kaplan 
and Strömberg (2008) described as the evolution of leveraged buyout activity through time 
and has been analyzed in detail in the literature review section. 
Regarding the industry division classification, the final sample resembles the initial. 
Table 4 classifies sample companies according to industry. In the initial sample, we observe 
that the majority of deals (30%) concentrate in the consumer-cyclical industry, and together 
Year buyout was completed 
Initial buyout sample Final buyout sample 
No. 
% of initial 
sample 
No. 
% of final 
sample 
% of initial 
sample 
1997 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1998 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1999 1 0.3 0 0.0 0.0 
2000 7 1.9 1 1.4 0.3 
2001 28 7.4 4 5.7 1.1 
2002 42 11.2 4 5.7 1.1 
2003 91 24.2 9 12.9 2.4 
2004 41 10.9 7 10.0 1.9 
2005 36 9.6 12 17.1 3.2 
2006 48 12.8 13 18.6 3.5 
2007 82 21.8 20 28.6 5.3 
Total 376 100 70 100 18.6 
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with consumer-non cyclical and industrial sectors account for 65% of the total deals. 
Financials, communication and technology industries come second with almost 27% of the 
deals. Basic materials, energy and diversified attract a very small number of deals. 
Accordingly, consumer-cyclical consumer-non cyclical and sectors industry account for 
60% of the deals, with the two first taking up even number of deals. Again, financials, 
communication and technology follow with slightly higher concentration.  
 
Table 4 Industry Membership  
of 376 Management Buyouts In Initial Sample and 70 Management Buyouts 
With Available Post-Buyout Performance Data In Final Sample, Completed 
Between 1997 and 2007 
Industry name 
Initial sample 
(N=376) 
Final Sample 
(N=70) 
#  firms % #  firms % 
Energy 6 1.6 1 1.4 
Consumer, Cyclical 111 29.5 15 21.4 
Consumer, Non-cyclical 67 17.8 14 20.0 
Industrial 65 17.3 13 18.6 
Communications 34 9.0 9 12.9 
Financial 44 11.7 9 12.9 
Basic Materials 15 4.0 3 4.3 
Technology 29 7.7 6 8.6 
Diversified 4 1.1 0 0.0 
N.A 1 0.3 0 0.0 
Total 376 100 70 100 
 
The above distribution is consistent with Robbie et al. (1991) assertion that “LBOs 
have tended to be concentrated in mature, cash-earning sectors-such as food and tobacco 
manufacturing- where low levels of technological and/or market uncertainty, facilitate 
divisional disposal and permit reductions in investment spending over the short term”. 
Moreover, Smith (1990) in her study of MBOs found that “the food and apparel industries 
are the most heavily represented in both the initial and final samples”. 
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The second source of potential sample selection bias comes from the data and 
variables used.  There is one possible flaw of accounting measures on a firm‟s performance 
and this is the manipulation of the financial statements around the time of the MBO from 
the managers. However, DeAngelo (1986), Kaplan (1989) and Lee (1992) cast doubt on the 
manipulation and private information arguments. On the other hand, Wu (1997) presents 
manipulation in firm‟s earnings in 87 management buyouts during the period 1980-1987 
and supports the argument that managers understate earnings before submitting the buyout 
proposal. Cumming et al. (2007) conclude that the recent research on buyout performance 
is consistent with the enhanced risk adjusted performance compared to industry 
benchmarks.  However, if managers manipulate the financial statements, the financial 
performance of buyouts is difficult to be captured with accounting measures. 
Even in cases that there is no manipulation, our analysis is subject to the limitations 
of ratio analysis that apart from the intentional misrepresentation or window-dressing, the 
use of balance sheet figures might not be a fair reflection of normal values because they are 
static, end of the year figures. It is also worth mentioning that different companies can use 
different measurement bases or off balance sheet finance (Elliot and Elliot, 2006). 
Moreover, we expect that differential accounting policies across countries my bias our 
estimates since our final sample consists of international data. 
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Chapter 5   
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Performance, Efficiency and Profitability 
In this section we present and analyse the post-MBO behaviour using fifteen performance 
measures as described in methodology section. When it comes to performance, these 
variables are financial metrics employed to assess a business‟s ability to generate earnings 
as compared to its expenses and other relevant costs incurred during a specific period of 
time. Usually the increment of a ratio compared to a previous period‟s value, indicates the 
company`s economic course (Investopedia, 2010). Table 10 summarizes the results of the 
present analysis.  
Efficiency is the level of performance that describes a process which uses the lowest 
amount of inputs to create the greatest amount of outputs. Any improvement in 
effectiveness and productivity emerging from the efficient use of the firm‟s resources, the 
operational improvement, cost reduction programs and tightening of management control 
will be evident in the following variables; however, any worsening will appear as well 
(Investopedia, 2010). 
Profitability indicators, focus on the firm‟s earnings. The most common profitability 
measures are Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). In particular, ROE 
measures profitability for contributors of equity capital. It is a basic factor in determining a 
firm‟s growth rate of earnings. The latter signifies that a declining ROE provides evidence 
that the firm‟s new investments have offered a lower ROE than its past investments. ROA 
measures profitability for all contributors of capital (Bodie et al., 2009). 
Our results illustrate that the mean value of ROE declines sharply two years before 
the deal completion, it rises insignificantly in the first and the third year after the deal and it 
experiences great decline in the second year (insignificant). The median changes are -36%, 
-45%, 15%, -18%, 10% over the (-3,-1), (-2,-1), (-1,+1),(-1,+2) and (-1,+3) windows, 
respectively, however, only the decreases in  (-3,-1) and (-2,-1) periods seem to be 
significant at the 10% level. 
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  Mean value of ROA significantly diminishes in the two-year period before the 
buyout, rises in the (-1, +1) and (-1, +2) periods and has an insignificant decline in the third 
year after the buyout. Medians also decline significantly in the two years before the buyout 
and continue to decline insignificantly by 5%, 19% and 15%, in years +1, +2 and +3, 
respectively, compared to year -1. 
We should be careful when interpreting ROE since the net profit input is affected by 
the firm‟s debt to equity mix and by the interest rate on its debt (Bodie et al., 2009). In case 
the deal is financed with debt we would expect ROE to decline unless there was an 
offsetting increase in earnings. Values do have a declining trend in the years after the 
buyout but trying to draw a conclusion from those two measures would be difficult because 
changes go to different directions and are insignificant. However, we can assert that 
profitability deteriorates in the years prior to the buyout as shown in the tables of results for 
ROE and ROA ratios. The effect of the debt to equity mix will be further examined in the 
section of leverage analysis. 
A ratio used to assess a company‟s efficiency at allocating the capital under control 
to profitable investments is Return on Capital (ROC). ROC measures how well a company 
is using its money to generate returns, and reveals whether invested capital was used 
effectively (Investopedia, 2010). However, it does not specify where the return is being 
generated. The mean ROC declines the years prior to the buyout and rises the following 3 
years. The median change is also negative over the (-3,-1) and (-2,-1) windows, and the 
changes for the years +1, +2, and +3 are 21%, -17% and 0.17%, respectively compared 
with year -1. All changes, after the buyouts are statistically insignificant.  
A ratio that overcomes the problem of how the return is generated and is used to 
specify the return from the company‟s continuous operations is Operating Cash Flow to 
Sales (CFO/Sales). It shows the ability of the company to turn sales into cash. The mean 
value of CFO to sales shows a positive trend with the exception of period (-1, +1). The 
median values are declining over (-3,-1) and (-2,-1) windows, and the changes for the years 
+1, +2, +3 are 34%, 20% and -10%, respectively compared with year -1. Kaplan (1989) and 
Opler (1992) detect a similar trend during the second post-buyout period. Specifically 
Kaplan (1989) notices that the median value rises by 11.9% in the two years after the LBO. 
Opler (1992) also finds a positive change of 16.6% for the same period. Both results are 
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significant and suggest better operating returns for the companies after the buyout. 
However, the changes in our sample are insignificant and we cannot draw the same 
conclusion about the companies‟ ability to improve their cash flows after the transaction.  
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) is an indicator of management efficiency, 
because it demonstrates how well managers have utilized the assets under their control 
(Elliot and Elliot, 2006). ROCE is the product of two primary operative level ratios, asset 
turnover and net profit margin. In our sample, mean and median ROCE changes show an 
insignificant declining trend in the years before the buyout. The mean changes are 82%, 
99% and 4% and the median are 37%, -2% and 65% in the years +1, +2, +3, respectively in 
comparison with year -1, but none of those changes is significant at any conventional level. 
Therefore, there is a positive but insignificant change in management efficiency after the 
buyout. In addition, ROCE is sensitive to factors concerning asset valuation policies and 
accounting policies in general and it cannot give us a clear indication about efficiency. In 
comparison with the study of Weir et al. (2008) who also examine ROCE in their sample of 
PTP transactions, we find different results, as they report significantly lower median ROCE 
in almost all years after the deals. This suggests that companies are actually less efficient in 
the years after the PTP transactions. 
Asset turnover measures a firm‟s efficiency at using its assets in generating sales or 
revenue. It actually represents the amount of sales generated for every euro‟s worth of 
assets (Investopedia, 2010). If the asset turnover ratio increases, either the total value of 
sales is increasing or the capital asset base is decreasing, or both. This means that although 
it is a good guide to company performance, it should also be evaluated in terms of its 
constituents. Mean and median asset turnover ratio decreases in the years prior to the 
buyout, with the mean decrease to be significant in the (-2,-1) window. In the post-buyout 
period both the mean and the median asset turnover ratio decrease. Mean values change by 
-25%, -36% (significantly at 10%) and -44% for the years +1, +2 and +3, respectively, 
compared to -1 and the medians change by -10%, -12% and -20% for the same periods. We 
argue that the significant decreases in means both before and after the buyout indicate a 
worsening condition in the ability of the firm to generate revenue from its resources and 
this can be either attributed to the reduction of sales or assets. 
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Profit margin, also known as return on sales, is a ratio of profitability. We use it as 
an indicator of profitability since an increase in earnings does not always mean that profits 
improve. That is due to the possibility that costs might also increase. Profit margin 
measures how much out of every euro of sales a company actually keeps in earnings. 
Hence, a high profit margin generally suggests good performance (Investopedia, 2010). The 
results from the analysis are mixed. The mean values decrease until year +1 and increase in 
years +2 and +3. Median profit margins constantly fall during all years under examination. 
However, all figures are statistically insignificant implying that profit margin cannot 
provide an unequivocal answer to the impact of MBOs on profitability.  
Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) and Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) are very common measures of profitability and 
are widely used in the studies of buyouts. EBIT is calculated as revenues minus expenses, 
excluding interest and taxes. It is also referred to as operating income. We analyse this 
measure because it neutralizes the effects of different capital structures and taxes imposed 
on every country and industry under examination. Mean EBIT changes positively in two 
periods before the buyout and the (-1, +2) period, but decreases in years +1 and +3 
compared with year -1. The median EBIT declines during all examined periods; however 
these decreases are not statistically significant. Therefore, we do not find any evidence of 
improvement in the companies' ability to generate profits in the post-buyout period. In 
contrast, Kaplan (1989) observes significant positive median changes in operating income 
during the examined periods. 
Apart from EBIT, we estimate EBITDA which excludes depreciation and 
amortization in order to eliminate the effects of accounting decisions. Therefore, it can 
provide an investor with a more clear view of a company‟s core profitability. According to 
Investopedia (2010) EBITDA first came into common use with leveraged buyouts in the 
1980s, when it was used to indicate the ability of a company to service debt and it is widely 
used in the relevant literature. The mean EBITDA increases in the first 4 periods of our 
examination and declines in the (-1, +3) period by 40%. Median EBITDA also declines in 
the years before the buyout and they change by 20%, 6% and -28% in the years +1, +2 and 
+3, respectively, compared to -1. All mean and median changes though are statistically 
insignificant. 
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EBITDA divided by total revenue brings us to another useful measure of a 
company‟s operating profitability, the EBITDA margin. The higher the EBITDA margin, 
the less operating expenses a company occurs. The mean values for (-3,-1), (-2,-1), (-1, +1) 
windows change positively, but in the following two years the changes are highly negative. 
Median values show negative changes for all examined periods, but both mean and median 
changes are insignificant. This negative pattern is consistent with the study of Guo et al. 
(2008) who also examine EBITDA margin and detect a negative change in the  (-1, +3) 
period in his LBOs sample. The fact that the examined time windows are similar makes 
those results directly comparable and suggest that the second wave of buyouts produced 
negative performance results. 
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) are expenses and are thought to create value for the 
firm indirectly in the case of a buyout. This is because the level of spending in new plant 
and equipment usually declines after the buyout in order to service debt or due to 
deteriorated investment policy causing the current cash flows to rise (Jensen, 1986). 
CAPEX mean value decreases before and increases after the buyout. The median CAPEX 
increase before the buyout and changes by -19%, -49% and 42% in years +1, +2 and +3, 
respectively, compared to -1. This suggests that companies cut investments in the first years 
after the transaction, possibly to serve debt payments, but start investing in property or 
equipment the third year and thus suffer greater expenses. The negative trend in the periods 
(-1, +1) and (-1, +2) is consistent with the hypothesis that buyout companies under-invest 
after the buyout and with similar studies like that of Kaplan (1989),  which reports that the 
companies reduce their level of capital expenditures in years +1 and +2 relative to year -1. 
However, both studies deliver insignificant results. 
We further examine the changes in CAPEX using the ratio of CAPEX/assets and 
CAPEX/sales. CAPEX to assets ratio has a declining mean and median value during the 
years before the buyout and the first year after the buyout without, however, changes to be 
significant. The mean value changes are -43% (significant at 5% level) and -49% 
(significant at 1% level) for years +2 and +3, respectively, compared with -1. The 
respective changes for median values are -56% (significant at 5% level) and -51% 
(significant at 10% level). These significant changes indicate that capital expenditures 
actually decreased after the buyout. 
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The mean CAPEX to sales ratio experiences a decrease in the first year after the 
buyout, an increase in the second year and then a significant decrease in year +3 compared 
to -1. The median values decrease during examined windows, but the changes are 
insignificant. The  results for  the two latter indices are comparable to the results of Kaplan 
(1989) and Opler (1992), who find significant negative changes in the same variables for 
the period (-1, +2) and thus,  support the view that the buyout companies fail to invest in 
positive net present value projects and activities.  
The mean sales growth rises dramatically before the buyout and diminishes 
considerably after that. Median sales growth, on the other hand, undergoes decreases over 
the (-3,-1) and (-2,-1) windows, increase in years +1, +2 and decrease again by 45% in year 
+3, compared to -1. All changes though are statistically non-significant. 
We also examine an overall measure for firm performance, the enterprise value. It is 
thought to be an accurate representation of a firm‟s value over market value because it 
includes the firm‟s debt (Investopedia, 2010). If the company has done well, has improved 
its effectiveness and used its resources more efficiently its value will increase. The mean 
enterprise value increases significantly the years before the buyout but decreases after it, 
though insignificantly. The median enterprise value, on the other hand, change negatively 
in (-3,-1) and (-2,-1) periods and increase by 30%, 34% and 99% in years +1, +2 and +3, 
respectively compared to -1. The median enterprise value changes are all insignificant and 
the changes of means and median for the same periods move to different directions, 
therefore, providing mixed results. 
Additionally, we examine specific expenses as a percentage of sales in order to have 
an additional cost management measure, such as the research and development 
expenditures to sales ratio. A ratio declining through years indicates a cost cutting policy. 
However, investors are interested in R&D to sales because it indicates the growth 
opportunities of the company and how much it invests in developing new products. 
However, both perspectives should be viewed with caution. A decrease in R&D expenses is 
considered normal during difficult financial years for a company which cuts expenses and 
raises cash flows by limiting R&D expenses, but it may hurt future growth. This is 
consistent with the notion that MBO incentives focus on short term gains and can 
discourage long term investment. On the other hand, excessive R&D expenses do not 
33 
 
necessarily mean high earnings since not all new products enter the market successfully. 
This means that investors should define not only how much is invested, but also how well 
the R&D investment is working for the company (Investopedia, 2010).  
The mean R&D expenditures to sales ratio shows a positive trend in the years prior 
to the buyout. The change in the ratio is positive for (-1, +1) period as well, but during the 
two last periods there are negative changes. The median ratio shows a negative trend in the 
years before the deal completion and the changes are also negative for (-1, +1) and (-1, +2) 
periods, while there is a positive change in (-1, +3) period. None of the changes is 
statistically significant, while mean and medians move in different directions in the pre 
buyout years. However, the negative trend of median values in the second post-MBO 
periods can be compared to the results of Opler (1992) and Smith (1990) who report a small 
negative change in the median value of R&D expense relative to sales. 
Overall, our results are mixed regarding the effect of MBOs in firm performance. In 
fact, we cannot detect any significant pattern for changes in performance either before or 
after the buyout for most of the variables used to proxy performance. As a small indication, 
we can conclude that profitability before the buyout is worsening from year to year and that 
there is no strong evidence that performance improves the following years.  
5.2. Liquidity 
Liquidity analysis refers to a company‟s ability to meet its short-term financial obligations 
by measuring how quickly assets are converted into cash (Robinson et al., 2009). The 
ability to pay current indebtedness is an important factor in assessing a company‟s riskiness 
of securities and its short term financial strength (Short and Libby, 2007; Bodie et al., 
2009). There are specific ratios that provide information about companies‟ liquidity and are 
widely used by suppliers and creditors, because when a company does not have available 
cash, it can lose its cash discounts and even its credit (Short and Libby, 2007; Business 
Knowledge Center, 2010). According to the literature, management buyouts should 
enhance firm‟s efficiency and result in better management of a firm‟s liquid assets. 
Therefore, we anticipate MBOs to boost liquidity management and controls in the post 
buyout periods. For the purpose of this work, we measure liquidity using eight widely used 
ratios, as already mentioned in Section 3. Table 11 contains the outcomes of this analysis.  
34 
 
 Current ratio is a measure of a company‟s short term liquidity and specifically it 
measures the ability of a firm to settle its current liabilities by liquidating its current assets, 
so as to avoid solvency in the short term (Bodie et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2009). The 
higher the ratio, the more capable the company is of settling its obligations (Robinson et al, 
2009). It is suggested that the ratio should be greater than two, but it actually depends on 
the individual firm and the industry sector, e.g. firms in cyclical industries should have a 
higher ratio so as to remain solvent during downturns (Elliot and Elliot, 2006; Business 
Knowledge Center, 2010). On the other hand, when current ratio is lower than one, it is 
possible that a company might be unable to settle its short term liabilities in case they came 
due at that moment. This situation could happen due to problems in receivables paid or in 
inventory turnover periods. This does not mean necessarily that a company with a low 
current ratio will become insolvent, as there are many financing means, but it suggests that 
the company could be in financial distress (Investopedia, 2010). Apparently, short term 
creditors would prefer companies with higher current ratio, as they face little risk of not 
getting paid; however stockholders may prefer their company to have a lower ratio so that 
more assets are employed. The main flaw of this ratio is that inventory sometimes includes 
items that are rather illiquid and have uncertain values (Business Knowledge Center, 2010). 
The results from the current ratio indicate that our sample firms has sufficient 
liquidity to meet their short term obligations across the five periods under examination. 
More specifically, both the mean and median values of current ratio exceed 1.5, and in 
some cases the ratio takes values of higher than 2. Changes in means and medians during 
the two pre buyout years show a small, however, statistically insignificant, positive increase 
in firm‟s liquidity. This means that any changes can be attributed to the MBO transaction. 
During the post buyout years, the mean current ratio changes by 4% and -4% in the (-1, +1) 
and (-1, +2) windows, and then increases in (-1, +3) window by 35%. In median level, there 
is a small decline in the first year followed by a 1% increase in the second year and a 10% 
decrease in the third year compared to year -1. All changes in means and medians during 
the post buyout period are statistically insignificant. Therefore, we can conclude that 
buyouts had no impact on the firms‟ liquidity as measured by current ratio. On the contrary, 
Desbrierers and Schatt (2002) report a statistically significant decline, thus indicating that 
buyouts deteriorate firms‟ ability to settle current indebtednesses.  
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 The main problem of using the current ratio can be overcome by using the quick 
ratio (also known as acid ratio) instead, which excludes inventory in the calculation. Quick 
ratio, therefore, shows the company‟s ability to meet its short term obligations using only 
cash and cash equivalents (Elliot and Elliot, 2006). Quick ratio results are similar to those 
of current ratio; firms do not seem to have sufficient liquidity to pay off their current 
liabilities. Compared to the current ratio, changes in both the mean and median quick ratio 
during pre-buyout years indicate stronger increase in firm‟s liquidity, but the changes are 
still statistically insignificant. During the post buyout periods mean and median changes 
illustrate a different picture: the mean changes show an increase whereas median changes 
decrease. For example, during the first post buyout year the mean change from year -1 is 
7% while the median change is -11% and during the third post buyout year the mean 
change is 47%, whereas the median change is -8%. None of these post buyout changes is 
statistically significant, so the management buyouts under investigation appear to have 
weak impact on firms‟ liquidity as measured by the quick ratio. This is in conflict with 
Desbrierers and Schatt (2002) finding that companies‟ quick ratio actually worsens after the 
MBO.   
Cash ratio is the most stringent liquidity ratio since it only includes the most liquid 
current assets: cash and cash equivalents (Weaver and Weston, 2001). Even a profitable 
company would end in financial distress if it had not enough cash to pay its employees and 
suppliers (Short and Libby, 2007). Consequently, cash ratio compares the euro amount of 
the most liquid assets for every euro of current obligations, and thus it indicates a firm‟s 
capability to meet its current liabilities in case immediate payment is required. Similar to 
current ratio, there is no optimal cash ratio, but it depends on the business and industry. In 
general, a cash ratio greater than one shows that a firm is capable of paying is current 
liabilities; however a too high one may suggest that a company is not employing enough 
resources to expand its business (Investopedia, 2010; Business Knowledge Center, 2010). 
Some analysts do not recommend the use of this ratio as it is very sensitive to small events, 
such as the collection of a large account receivable (Short and Libby, 2007) 
Cash ratio results indicate that firms are generally not capable of settling their short 
term obligations with the available cash. During the pre-buyout years means and medians 
experience insignificant small positive and negative changes respectively, confirming the 
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lack of discernible trend in the pre-buyout period. In the post buyout periods, the mean cash 
ratio increases by 49% and 115% during the first and the third period respectively, while 
the median value decreases by 31% and 5% during the (-1,+1) and (-1,+2) periods 
respectively, and rises afterwards by 19%. Still these changes are not statistically 
significant, so again we can‟t conclude that MBOs have a positive effect on companies‟ 
liquidity. 
Working capital ratio measures both a firm‟s efficiency and short term financial 
health. A positive value indicates that a company is capable of meeting its short term 
obligations by liquidating its current assets, whereas a negative value suggests that a 
company needs more funds in order to settle its short term liabilities. A declining working 
capital ratio over a long time period should be subject to further investigation. Although a 
positive working capital ratio can promise creditors that they will be paid, a large and 
growing working capital ratio compared to the previous period could also indicate 
operational inefficiency, in case current assets are increased due to higher account 
receivables, which means a company delays to collect owed money, or due to unwarranted 
growth in inventories (Brewer et al., 2008; Investopedia, 2010).   
Our results for the working capital ratio indicate that sample firms have positive 
mean and median values throughout the pre and post buyout periods, suggesting that 
companies could pay off their creditors without needing more funds. The results in means 
and medians in the pre buyout period are statistically insignificant, indicating that there is 
not a continuation trend affecting the post buyout figures. During the first year after the 
buyout there is a decrease in both mean and median values, but during the following years 
this decline turns into positive changes. However, all post buyout changes are statistically 
insignificant.  
The inventory to cash days ratio belongs to a more specific liquidity ratio category, 
the asset utilization ratios, since it is closely related to both short term liquidity and 
operating efficiency. It shows how many days on average a company needs to sell its goods 
and collect cash from its customers (Short and Libby, 2007).  
The results for inventory to cash days ratio indicate that during all five periods both 
means and medians (except for (-1 to +2) period) suggest that the sample companies need 
fewer days to transform their products into money. This may mean that the rise in working 
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capital ratio, as aforementioned, is not related with higher cash collection periods. 
Disappointingly, there are not statistically significant results, so we cannot suggest that 
there is a trend in the pre buyout years that continues in the post buyout period or that the 
MBO sample really affects the efficiency of the firms in transforming goods into cash more 
rapidly. These results pattern is similar to those of Smith (1990); however she finds a 
statistical significant change from year -1 to year +1. 
The accounts payable turnover period (in days) ratio is a short-term liquidity ratio 
used to show how many days a company needs to pay off its suppliers. It also belongs to 
the asset utilization ratios. Any changes in the payment period may be caused by suppliers 
that have changed credit terms, the company trying to gain maximum credit facilities, or the 
company using early payments to gain discounts or other benefits (Elliot and Elliot, 2006). 
Easily we can conclude that if the accounts payable turnover period (in days) ratio is falling 
from one period to another, the company is paying off suppliers at a faster rate. On the 
other hand, if it is increasing the company needs more days to settle its liabilities with 
suppliers, maybe due to lack of cash and/or liquid items.  
The results for this indicator show that during the years after the buyout, firms 
generally need more days to pay off their suppliers, since in year +1 they need 2,250% 
(mean result) or 6% (median result) more days compared to the year -1, while in year +3 
they need 515% (mean result) or 39% (median result) more days compare to year -1. All 
changes are insignificant for all periods examined, measured by both means and medians. 
These results pattern is quite similar to those of Smith (1990), who finds important positive 
changes throughout the four examined periods and especially statistical significant for the 
two pre buyout periods. 
The last two liquidity ratios that we have selected to use in this study measure cash 
as a percentage of the total and the current assets respectively. These ratios reveal 
companies‟ view about how important cash is for their operations. Very low ratios may 
indicate that companies believe their non-cash assets could be readily liquidate in case of 
immediate payment requirements or that they have bad cash management. On the other 
hand, very high ratios may suggest that companies don‟t invest the surplus cash to grow 
their business, or that they have currently increased need for available cash Finally, we 
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should mention that these ratios may be very sensitive to asset changes, e.g. purchase of an 
asset like PPE (Property, Plant and Equipment) with cash.  
The outcomes of this analysis, suggest that firms in the sample may have enough 
cash to meet their needs as cash as a percentage of current assets or as a percentage of total 
assets fluctuates in sufficient levels, throughout the five periods.  The pattern for both ratios 
is quite similar. During the pre buyout years the changes in both means and medians are 
positive. We must underline that the 13% change from year -3 to year -1 for cash to current 
assets ratio, is statistically significant at 1% level. On the contrary, in the post buyout 
periods there are no statistical significant results for both ratios. During the first two periods 
the results for both ratios give a blur picture as mean and median suggest changes in the 
opposite direction. However, in the third period the mean and median values for both ratios 
suggest that there is an important increase in cash as proportion of assets compared to year -
1.  
Overall, our analysis for the liquidity indicators make us conclude that there is some 
evidence that firms have better liquidity positions after the buyout. Nevertheless, the 
absence of any statistically significant changes indicates no specific impact of MBOs in the 
post buyout liquidity of the firms. This outcomes should however, be interpreted with 
caution since observations are fewer as years go by.  
 
5.3. Leverage and Solvency 
Leverage results from the difference between the rate of return a company gains from its 
investments and the rate of return that it should pay to its creditors (Brewer, 2008). 
Generally, it refers to any practice that helps companies multiply gains but losses as well.  
Commonly, public firms use debt in order to leverage their equity. As companies cover 
their money needs with borrowed funds, they need less equity portion in their capital 
structure, so that any future profits or losses are exaggerated. Consequently, financial 
leverage ratios show the capital structure of a company and the extent to which the firm is 
using debt, particularly long term. When a company relies on more debt than equity from 
its shareholders, it is considered to be highly leveraged. Solvency, unlike liquidity, refers to 
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a company‟s ability to meet its long term liabilities (Short and Libby, 2007; Robinson et al., 
2009). 
 Leverage and solvency are highly related, as leverage magnifies long term 
liabilities, and in case of losses and downturns companies are more exposed to financial 
distress and bankruptcy, due to their small equity base and the fact that they have to 
continue servicing debt. According to the literature, MBOs are anticipated to increase 
firms‟ leverage as they are financed mainly with debt, and possibly worsen their solvency 
indicators.  After consulting the relevant literature and books, nine indicators have been 
chosen to measure leverage and solvency. Table 12 reports the results of our analysis.  
First of all, we begin our analysis with the raw figure of total debt acquired from the 
sample firm‟s financial statements. An increase in this figure will indicate that managers 
burdened their firms with loans in order to complete this acquisition and magnify the 
potential future profits. The results show that there is an impressive 90% increase in median 
total debt during the first year after the transaction compared to the year before it. The 
amount of total debt is becoming bigger during the second and the third year, as median 
changes by 110% and 173% respectively. In the years before the buyout it is difficult to 
find any trend which can justify the large increase of the post buyout years, as total debt 
increases by 37% over the (-3,-1) window, but then it diminishes by 4% over the (-2,-
1)window. None of these changes is statistically significant according to the Mann 
Whitney/ Wilcoxon test for medians. On the other hand, when we use means, the changes 
measured are positive throughout all five periods, with statistically significant differences at 
the 10% level during the two periods before the deal. However, mean results are too 
conservative compared to the median ones, and we believe that in this case outliers have 
dominated the means in the small sample analyzed.  
Furthermore, the debt to equity indicator is considered to be a key ratio for a 
company valuation. It stands for the proportion of equity and debt a firm is using to fund its 
assets. A high debt to equity ratio generally indicates that a firm has been financing its 
growth aggressively with debt. This can result in volatile earnings due to high interest 
payments (Brewer, 2008; Investopedia, 2010). In addition, debt can be very risky due to the 
fact that interest payments have to be made even if the firm has not enough resources to 
settle them, and may lead to bankruptcy. On the other hand, payments to equity holders, 
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such as dividends, are at the board of directors‟ discretion. Thus equity is believed to be 
cheaper and less risky than debt. In spite of the dangers associated with debt financing, the 
majority of firms turn to the debt market for funds in order to enjoy the advantages of 
leverage and potential tax benefits.  
According to the outcomes, both mean and median values of debt to equity ratio 
change positively throughout all five year periods under examination. The year before the 
buyout, mean debt to equity rises statistically significantly at the 5% level. The latter 
changes by 36% and 23% compared to year -3 and year -2 respectively, whereas in median 
level, the respective increases- though statistically insignificant- are 4% and 16%. During 
the post buyout years, the mean changes compared to year -1 are more impressive but 
insignificant. In contrast, median changes are more conservative, as they are not affected by 
outliers, but also insignificant. Finally, it is worth mentioning that when we examine mean 
differences, companies seem to be high leveraged throughout all five periods, whereas 
when we examine medians, the sample firms seem to be financed by almost half equity, 
half debt, and only during the third year the value exceeds 100%. 
 A firm that bears a high gearing ratio is mainly funded by debt and it is more 
vulnerable to downturns, while a company with a low gearing ratio relies on shareholders‟ 
financing and thus it is financially stronger. Creditors and stockholders prefer different 
levels of gearing, as are conversely influenced by its changes (Elliot and Elliot, 2006).  
 Our analysis on gearing ratio illustrate that the sample companies are not highly 
leveraged, even after the buyout, as equity outweighs debt in the capital structure. 
However, during the first post buyout years, firms experienced an increase in both average 
and median values, as expected by the theory, of approximately 30%, compared to the pre 
buyout year. This increase in mean differences is also maintained during the second and the 
third years after the buyout, and more importantly, they are statistically significant at 1% 
and 10% respectively. The median results for the second post buyout period (-1, +2) 
indicate a bigger percentage increase (55%), though statistically insignificant, compared to 
the mean change (28%). Finally in the third post buyout period (-1, +3) we have a 
statistically insignificant 6% decline in the ratio. The pre-buyout changes for both means 
and medians show a tendency of the gearing ratio to increase slightly during the pre buyout 
year compared to the -2 and -3 years; however these changes are insignificant.  
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 The debt to capital ratio reports the proportion of a company‟s capital represented 
by debt. This indicator shows a company‟s capital structure, its degree of leverage and also 
its financial solvency. Normally, it is calculated as a firm‟s total debt divided by its total 
capital. However, since it is not a GAAP measure, there are many alternative ways of 
calculating it, such as including only the long term debt. In the present study both ways are 
implemented. A high debt to capital ratio signifies that a company is using more debt than 
equity, and thus indicates high financial risk and weak solvency (Robinson et al., 2009; 
Investopedia. 2010) 
 Concerning total debt to total capital results, our analysis indicates that during the 
first post-buyout year the mean change (+35%) is statistically different from zero compared 
to the year -1 at 10% level of significance. In the rest periods, neither the mean nor the 
median positive changes are statistically significant from zero. In contrast, the mean 
positive changes for the long-term debt to total capital ratio are statistically significant, at 
5% and 10% level, for the (-2 to -1), (-1 to +1), (-1 +2) and (-1 to +3) periods, thus 
reporting a positive trend from the year before the buyout. In contrast, none of the positive 
median changes are statistically different from zero. 
 Debt to asset ratios examine what proportion of a firm‟s assets has been financed 
with borrowed funds, and therefore indicating its financial risk. If debt exceeds assets, then 
a company is considered to be highly leveraged, highly risky and weakly solvent (Robinson 
et al., 2009). In our study we use two debt to asset ratios; the first is the total debt to total 
assets ratio, whereas the second one excludes short term debt.  
  To begin with, the total debt to total assets ratio is increased during the year -1 
relative to years -3 and -2 by a mean change of 7% and 24% respectively, whereas the 
median changes are 20% and 16%. None of these changes are statistically significant. 
During the first year after the buyout both mean and median values rises, though 
statistically insignificantly, by 9% and 18% respectively. In the second year after the 
buyout we find a significant at 5% level positive median change by 7%, whereas there is a 
negative, but insignificant, mean change by 2%, always relative to the year preceding the 
deal. In contrast, Desbrierers and Schatt (2002) detect a 15.8% mean change, significant at 
the 1% level. Finally, during the third year both mean and median changes are insignificant, 
and they present conflicting results.  
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Concerning the long-term debt to assets ratio, it seems to have positive changes 
throughout all five periods both measured by mean and median. In addition, the mean 
changes for (-2 to -1), (-1 to +2) and (-1 to +3) periods are statistically significant, 
indicating that there is an important increase in leverage in the post buyout period and it 
could be  partially affected by the trend in the pre-buyout period.  
 In addition to the above leverage and solvency indicators, interest coverage ratio 
(also known as interest earned ratio) has been examined for any changes after the 
management buyouts.  It is the most common indicator of how many times a firm‟s 
operating income could cover its interest payments during a specific period (Robinson et 
al., 2009; Weaver and Weston, 2001). It is based on EBIT because it represents the 
earnings available for interest payments. However, in periods of uncommon growth where 
EBIT and EBITDA do not move in the same way, it can be calculated with EBITDA. 
(Elliot and Elliot, 2006). A high interest coverage ratio -greater than one- signifies that 
profits can cover current interest obligations, and thus indicates strong solvency and 
provides assurance and protection to creditors, especially when it is bigger than two 
(Brewer et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2009). In contrast, if interest expense exceeds profits, 
the likelihood of bankruptcy is very high (Bodie et al., 2009). 
 The sample companies seem to face no obstacle to settle their interest payments, as 
throughout all years both interest coverage ratios exceed unity, measured by both mean and 
median. However, both mean and median differences are negative for all five periods 
examined, but none of them is statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot conclude 
whether that MBOs have worsened the company‟s solvency or that this is a continuation of 
a pre buyout trend. On the other hand, the alternative interest coverage ratio that uses 
EBITDA, provides evidence that sample companies‟ ability to pay off their interest 
expenses deteriorates after the buyout. During the pre buyout years, almost all changes are 
positive but also insignificant, whereas in the post buyout period all changes are negative. 
More precisely, during the first and the third year after the buyout we find statistical 
significant changes of -59% and -48% compared to the year preceding the buyout.  
To conclude, the present study provides evidence that the leverage and the solvency of 
the firms that have undergone a management buyout are affected adversely after the deal is 
completed, and is consistent with the literature findings.  
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5.4. Investment 
In this section we analyze the variables regarding the investment behaviour of MBOs. This 
category of ratios attracts considerable investor interest. Investors are the stockholders who 
purchase the stocks with the hope that those assets will provide them with future income 
and generally create wealth by future appreciation (Investopedia, 2010). Those variables 
include information about dividends, the market price of shares and the growth 
opportunities of the company. It is obvious that the indicators that include the dividend 
variable concern dividend-paying companies and those that include both dividend and 
market price are examined only for companies which continued having trading stocks after 
the buyout. Table 13 presents the results for investment ratios.  
First, we analyse the dividend-related variables. Dividend is the distribution of a 
portion of a company‟s earnings, decided by the board of directors, to its shareholders. 
Dividends are of great interest to investors because they are a form of profit distribution 
to the shareholders. The dividend is most often quoted in terms of the euro amount each 
share receives (dividends per share) (Investopedia, 2010). It can also be quoted in terms of 
a percent of the current market price, referred to as dividend yield. In general, the dividend 
policy of a company affects investors‟ decision and the way they perceive the profitability 
and sustainability of a company. We can observe increases and decreases in a stock price 
due to dividend distributions. Having a growing dividend per share can be perceived from 
the market as a sign that the management of the company believes in its sustainable growth. 
Many healthy and profitable companies offer dividends to their stockholders. However, 
those signs can be misleading because a company‟s dividend policy can be affected by 
many factors and the decision about how much it will be paid out to shareholders in 
dividends is not always a matter of profitability, but also of cash availability and investment 
decisions.  
Before analyzing dividend-related ratios, we refer to some arguments and theories 
for and against dividend distribution. The argument against dividends is based on the belief 
that a firm that reinvests funds rather than paying them out as dividends will increase the 
value of the firm as a whole and consequently increase the market value of the stock 
(Investopedia, 2010). According to this view, a company with excess of cash can make 
investments (of any kind) and grow in size. On the other hand, a high dividend payout is 
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important for investors because dividends provide certainty about the company‟s financial 
well-being. 
In general, companies retain earnings and do not pay them out in the form of 
dividends when the rate of return on funds invested inside the company exceeds the rate of 
return that stockholders could earn on alternative investments. This is why we see 
companies during high growth faze to pay little or no dividends whereas companies with 
steady earnings and little growth opportunities tend to pay higher and steady dividends 
(Brewer et al., 2008).  
In our sample there is a significant increase in mean dividend paid in (-3,-1) period 
but the following years the changes go to different directions. Medians changes are -100%, 
-90% and +162% in years +1, +2 and +3, respectively compared to year -1. The changes 
are statistically non-significant and cannot have a clear picture about the effect of MBOs in 
firms‟ dividend policy. 
We also test the dividend yield ratio that measures the rate of return that would be 
earned by an investor who buys common stock at the current market price (Brewer et al., 
2008). If there are no capital gains, dividend yield is the return from investing to the stock. 
This ratio shows how much cash flow the investor gets for each euro invested in equity. 
Investors who require a minimum stream of cash flow from their investment portfolio can 
secure this cash flow by investing in stocks paying relatively high, stable dividend yields 
(Investopedia, 2010). The mean dividend yield demonstrates a negative change in (-3,-1) 
period, a sharp increase in the first and second year after the buyout and then a decline. The 
median dividend yield shows a decrease in the period before the buyout and changes by 
220%, -94%, -53% in years +1, +2 and +3, respectively compared with year -1. The results 
for mean and median dividend yield are controversial and appear to be statistically 
insignificant. However, we can trace a decrease in (-3,-1) window and a great increase in 
the first year after the buyout. 
We continue our analysis with the dividend payout ratio which is the portion of 
earnings paid out to shareholders as dividends. The payout ratio provides an idea of how 
well earnings support the dividend payments (Brewer et al., 2008). As already mentioned 
more mature companies with limited reinvestment opportunities tend to have a higher 
payout ratio, while companies with high growth opportunities tend to have lower payout 
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ratios. We find that the, mean payout ratio has an upward trend until the second year after 
the buyout a downward trend in the third year. Note that the great mean increase in (-1, +2) 
period; however, the median change for the same period, although positive, is lower. 
Nevertheless we observe an increase, although insignificant for the (-1, +2) period, but in 
the last period both the mean and median payout ratio experiences negative change 
compared with year -1.  
Next, we examine the price to book ratio. It measures the value that financial 
markets attach to the management and organization of the firm (Weaver and Weston, 
2001). Therefore, assuming that book value reflects the fair value of a company‟s assets, 
the price to book ratio indicates that the company‟s future returns are expected to be equal 
to the return required by the market (Robinson et al., 2008). The mean price to book ratio 
shows a negative trend after the buyout. We argue that the market perceives diminishing 
price to book ratios as an indication of deterioration of financial position. Median values, 
on the other hand, show negative changes in the years prior to the buyout and increase after 
the buyout compared to year -1. However, all changes are insignificant and the results 
should be viewed with caution. 
The last dividend-related variable is the cash dividend coverage. It expresses the 
amount by which a company‟s earnings exceed its dividends and the higher a company's 
earnings are relative to its dividends, the better its dividend coverage (Investopedia, 2010). 
The mean dividend coverage ratio shows a negative behaviour. The median dividend 
coverage ratio does not have a trend before the buyout. The changes are -2%, 3% and 4% in 
the years +1, +2 and +3, respectively compared with year -1. There results do not reveal 
considerable change in the dividend coverage ratio due to MBO activity.   
Overall, our results do not offer a clear picture regarding the effect of MBOs in 
dividend policy of firms  However, we should take into account the differential dividend 
policy that each firm and industry adopts industries that the sample companies belong to 
and the different policy that .  
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5.5. Comparison to Previous Studies 
As it has already mentioned, there is an extensive literature that investigates whether 
management buyouts are accompanied with increased performance and better profits. In 
Table 14 we present an indicative summary of this literature, by reporting the disclosed 
changes in key ratios observed in ten important past studies. We also include the present 
study‟s findings for comparison reasons. However, any conclusions should be drawn with 
caution, as the results of any study depend on what measure, time period, geographic 
location and window of the sample is used and how the sample is constructed, and it is 
crystal clear that there are such differences across the above studies. 
Briefly, this study appears to arrive at different outcomes and conclusions in 
comparison with the early empirical studies that examine the first wave of buyouts. In each 
and every early study we find that the CFO/sales as a performance indicator increases in the 
post buyout period, while the present study presents a deterioration of this ratio. On the 
other hand, this study is consistent with Opler (1992), Smith (1990) and Kaplan‟s (1989) 
findings that capital expenditures, unedited or deflated by sales and assets, decline 
significantly in the post-buyout period. There is also some evidence that firms need more 
time to pay off their indebtednesses, as suggested by Smith (1990) and the present study.  
Finally, in spite of the fact that there are not so many recent studies that examine the 
performance of second wave of MBOs to compare our findings, we seem to find similar 
results with Guo et al. (2009), Weir et al. (2008) and Desbrierers and Schatt (2002) 
concerning the companies‟ profitability and leverage position after the buyout.  
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Chapter 6   
 
6. Conclusion 
The recent wave of leveraged buyout transactions has drawn international attention to the 
impact of such deals on the corporations. Based on the findings of past studies that 
examined the first surge, nowadays researchers have been trying to figure out whether 
leveraged buyouts, and especially management buyouts, still boost companies‟ 
performance and efficiency. The current study investigates changes in performance and 
efficiency following 70 MBOs around the world that took place between 1997 and 2007. 
The results of our study are closely consistent with that of Guo (2009), Acharya and 
Kehoe (2008) and Leslie and Oyer (2008) who also study recent MBO deals and find weak 
or generally no evidence of greater profitability or efficiency in the post buyout period. 
Examining both mean and median changes in profitability and efficiency variables we do 
not find support significant changes in post MBO period Furthermore, the results from 
liquidity did not show any improvement for firms that got involved in an MBO activity, 
consistent with Evans et al. (2005) finding. On the other hand, companies engaged in an 
MBO witnessed a significant increase in their leverage level. This result is in line with our 
expectations and the results of Evans et al. (2005) who argued that companies have lower 
leverage during the pre buyout years. Finally, the investment ratios under investigation 
provide no evidence of future growth and expansion prospects.  
Overall, our results suggest that the recent wave of MBOs did not change dramatically 
the financial position of firms and support the arguments of Long and Ravenscraft (1991) 
and Cao and Lerner (2009) that the post 1980‟s buyouts may be different from the earlier 
deals, maybe due to limited attractive targets, as returns have deteriorated.  
Although, our analysis tried to test the post-MBO performance behaviour using a 
sample of a firms worldwide, there are some issues that could be further investigated and 
have not been addressed in this study. First, our analysis employs mean and median 
changes for each selected variable using the raw differences of annual data. The main bias 
generated from this method is the assumption that the expected change in performance in 
the absence of restructuring would be zero. Further research could examine the effect of 
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restructuring in variables used by employing “the difference of differences method” defined 
as the change in the variables, less the change in the same variables of comparable firms. 
The above mentioned method has been widely employed by previous literature as most 
studies have managed to control this bias by using the industry-adjusted change, which is 
the percentage change in the variable for the buyout company minus the percentage change 
over the relevant period for all firms in the same industry (Kaplan, 1989). However, this 
methodology was not easy to be implemented in our study due to the wide range of MBOs 
and the industries that belong to.   
Future researchers could also examine some other variables that were missing in our 
study. For example, it could be interesting to examine the effect of MBOs in employment 
and board structure. The hypothesis of value creation through cost reductions at the expense 
of employees who suffer job and wage cuts could be a. direction for future research. 
Another issue that deserves future attention is the longevity of the buyout results. Since our 
sample includes deals from the recent resurgence of buyouts it apparently seeks for 
medium-term changes. Using data that go beyond the three year period after the deal could 
test further the changes and especially the leverage parameter that according to our analysis 
suffered significant changes after the buyout. 
This research has been successfully completed as it provides some evidence that 
supports the recently laid arguments that an MBO does not still boost a company‟s 
performance and efficiency. In addition, it contributes to the literature as it fills the gap of 
recent research on post MBO performance concerning a worldwide sample, since the 
majority studies focus in buyouts that occurred in a specific country or region, and took 
place in 1980s or 1990s. Therefore, it could be useful to any parties engaged in such 
transactions, such as management groups, financing institutions, who wish to consult an 
empirical study and be informed about the possible future risks and returns, before 
proceeding to an MBO. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 5 Formulation of Variables 
Variable Label Formulation 
Profitability, Performance and Efficiency Variables 
Return on Equity ROE 
(Net Income/Total Common 
Equity) * 100 
Return on Assets ROA EBIT/Total Assets 
Return on Capital  ROC 
((Net Income +Minority 
Interest+ Interest Expense*[1-
(Effective Tax 
Rate/100)])/Average total 
Capital)*100 
Operating Cash Flow to Sales CFO to sales 
Operating Cash Flow / Sales 
Revenue 
Return on Capital Employed ROCE 
EBIT/(Total Assets-Current 
Liabilities) 
Asset Turnover Asset turnover 
(Net Sales/Average Total 
Assets)*100 
Profit Margin Profit margin (Net Income/Net Sales)*100 
Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes 
EBIT 
Revenues –expenses 
(excluding interest and taxes) 
Earnings Before Interest, 
Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization 
EBITDA 
Revenues –expenses 
(excluding interest taxes, 
depreciation and amortization) 
EBITDA Margin EBITDA margin EBITDA/Total Revenue 
Capital Expenditures CAPEX Capital Expenditures 
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Capital Expenditures/Assets CAPEX/assets 
Capital Expenditures/Total 
Assets 
Capital Expenditures/Sales CAPEX/sales 
Capital Expenditures/Total 
Sales 
Sales Growth Sales growth Sales Growth 
Enterprise Value Enterprise value 
Market Cap +Debt +Minority 
interest + Preferred shares- 
Total cash and Cash 
equivalents. 
Research and Development 
Expenses to Sales 
R&D to sales 
Research and Development 
Expenses/Sales 
 
 
 
Liquidity Variables 
Current Ratio Current ratio 
Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities 
Quick Ratio Quick ratio 
(Current Assets-
Inventory)/Current Liabilities 
Cash Ratio Cash ratio 
Cash and Near Cash 
Items/Current Liabilities 
Working Capital Ratio Working capital 
Current Assets-Current 
Liabilities 
Inventory to Cash Days  Inventory to cash days ratio 
Inventory Turnover Days+ 
Accounts Receivable Turnover 
Days 
Accounts Payable Turnover 
Period in Days 
Accounts payable turnover 
period 
(Accounts Payable/Sales)*365 
Cash to Total Assets Cash to total assets Cash/Total Assets 
Cash to Current Assets Cash to current assets Cash/Current Assets 
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Leverage and Solvency Variables 
Total Debt Total debt 
Long Term Debt+ Short Term 
Debt 
Debt to Equity Ratio Debt to equity (Total Debt/Total Equity)*100 
Gearing Ratio Gearing ratio 
(Total Liabilities – Current 
Liabilities)/Capital Employed* 
*Capital Employed Capital employed 
Total Assets – Current 
Liabilities 
Debt to Capital Ratio Debt to capital  Total Debt/Total Capital 
Total Debt to Total Assets Total debt to total assets (Total Debt /Total Assets)*100 
Long Term Debt to Total Assets Long term debt to total assets 
(Long Term Debt/ Total 
Assets)*100 
Interest Coverage Ratio Interest coverage ratio EBIT/Total Interest Expense 
Interest Coverage Ratio Interest coverage ratio EBITDA/ Total Interest Expense 
Investment Variables 
Dividend Paid DVD paid Dividend Paid 
Dividend Yield DVD yield 
Trailing 12 month DVD per 
share /End Price per Share 
Dividend Payout Ratio DVD payout ratio 
(Cash Common 
Dividends/(Income before XO-
Minority Interest-Cash Pref. 
Dividend))*100 
Price to Book Ratio Price to book ratio 
Last Price/Book Value per 
Share 
Cash Dividend Coverage Cash DVD coverage 
(Income before XO- Minority 
Interest -Cash Preferred 
Dividend)/Cash Common 
Dividend 
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Table 6 List of Sources for the Variables Employed 
Examined variables 
Sources of  examined 
variables 
CAPEX Kaplan (1989) 
R&D Expenditures to Sales, CAPEX/Sales, Inventory to Cash Days, 
Accounts Payable Turnover Days, Total Debt to Total Assets Smith (1990) 
EBIT Singh (1990) 
Total Debt to Total Capital Ofek (1994) 
Asset Turnover Weir (1996) 
ROA, ROE, Quick Ratio, Current Ratio, Gearing Ratio 
Wright et al. (1996) 
 
EBITDA Margin Bergström et al. (2007) 
CFO/Sales 
Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2008) 
Cash to Assets,  Price to Book Ratio Katz (2008) 
ROCE, EBITDA Weir et al. (2008) 
Long Term Debt to Asset, Interest Coverage Ratio Cao and Lerner (2009) 
Sales Growth,  Total Debt to Equity Acharya et al. (2010) 
Working Capital Investopedia (2010) 
ROC, CAPEX/Assets, Enterprise Value, Cash Ratio, Cash and Cash 
Equivalents /Current Assets, Long Term Debt/Total Capital, Total Debt, 
EBITDA/Total Interest Expense, DVD paid, Dividend Yield, DVD Payout 
Ratio, Cash Dividend Coverage, Price to Book Ratio 
Elliot and Elliot, Brewer 
et al., Robinson et al., 
Short and Libby 
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Table 7 List of Management Buyouts Sample Companies 
Company Country Industry Sector Announcement 
Date 
Completion 
Date 
HeidelbergCement AG Germany Industrial 10/6/2005 12/8/2005 
Banco de Sabadell SA Spain Financial 21/12/2006 21/12/2006 
IG Group PLC UK Consumer, Cyclical 29/7/2003 12/11/2003 
Asseco Poland SA Poland Technology 3/3/2000 3/3/2000 
BANIF SGPS SA Portugal Financial 5/6/2003 14/10/2003 
Scholz & Friends AG Germany Communications 9/6/2003 14/7/2003 
Turcas Petrolculuk AS Turkey Consumer, Cyclical 13/6/2005 30/6/2005 
FULLSIX Italy Communications 22/2/2006 4/8/2006 
Integrata AG Germany Consumer, Non-cyclical 2/10/2003 2/10/2003 
Andritz AG Austria Industrial 23/8/2004 23/8/2004 
Germania-Epe AG Germany Financial 9/3/2001 9/3/2001 
Econet.Hu Media 
Telecommunications and Holding PL Hungary Communications 28/12/2007 28/12/2007 
Digigram SA France Industrial 14/1/2003 31/12/2003 
Alliance Boots Holdings Ltd UK Consumer, Cyclical 9/3/2007 28/6/2007 
Pol-Aqua SA Poland Industrial 29/11/2007 29/11/2007 
CCR Logistics Systems AG Germany Industrial 10/1/2007 29/3/2007 
Insight Communications Co Inc US Communications 7/3/2005 19/12/2005 
Sealy Corp US Consumer, Cyclical 4/3/2004 6/4/2004 
Dole Food Co Inc/Old US Consumer, Non-cyclical 22/9/2002 31/3/2003 
HealthMarkets Inc US Financial 15/9/2005 5/4/2006 
William Lyon Homes US Consumer, Cyclical 14/3/2006 14/6/2006 
Quintiles Transnational Corp US Consumer, Non-cyclical 14/10/2002 26/9/2003 
Michael Foods Inc US Consumer, Non-cyclical 22/12/2000 11/4/2001 
Stephan Co/The US Consumer, Non-cyclical 16/4/2002 16/4/2002 
Pierre Foods Inc US Consumer, Non-cyclical 27/4/2001 29/7/2002 
Schuff International Inc US Industrial 29/4/2004 3/8/2004 
Windswept Environmental Group Inc US Industrial 4/7/2005 4/7/2005 
AngelCiti Entertainment Inc US Consumer, Cyclical 7/6/2004 7/6/2004 
Winsonic Digital Media Group Ltd US Communications 21/7/2004 16/8/2004 
Notify Technology Corp US Technology 30/5/2007 29/5/2007 
Westaff Inc US Consumer, Non-cyclical 2/3/2007 2/3/2007 
Kinder Morgan Inc US Energy 29/5/2006 31/5/2007 
Biomet Inc US Consumer, Non-cyclical 18/12/2006 26/9/2007 
Station Casinos Inc US Consumer, Cyclical 4/12/2006 8/11/2007 
OSI Restaurant Partners Inc US Consumer, Cyclical 6/11/2006 14/6/2007 
NCO Group Inc/Old US Consumer, Non-cyclical 16/5/2006 16/11/2006 
Cosmos Initia Co Ltd Japan Financial 27/5/2005 1/7/2005 
Usen Corp Japan Communications 24/7/2006 8/8/2006 
Intelsat SA Bermuda Communications 16/8/2004 28/1/2005 
International Container Terminal 
Services Inc Philippines Consumer, Non-cyclical 4/5/2006 4/5/2006 
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GMO internet Inc Japan Communications 13/12/2006 29/12/2006 
MYOB Ltd Australia Technology 21/2/2006 21/2/2006 
KFC Holdings Malaysia Bhd Malaysia Consumer, Cyclical 4/8/2003 4/8/2003 
Central UNI Co Ltd Japan Consumer, Non-cyclical 3/6/2005 23/6/2005 
Town Health International 
Investments Ltd Hong Kong Consumer, Non-cyclical 21/4/2005 31/5/2005 
Barplats Investments Ltd 
South 
Africa Basic Materials 18/6/2004 23/7/2004 
Maxbro Co Ltd 
South 
Korea Industrial 17/5/2006 13/6/2006 
SC Global Developments Ltd Singapore Financial 13/10/2003 13/10/2003 
Matichon PCL Thailand Communications 4/10/2005 9/11/2005 
Progen Holdings Ltd Singapore Industrial 14/9/2001 19/10/2001 
Amax Holdings Ltd Hong Kong Consumer, Cyclical 4/4/2002 21/8/2002 
HLB Inc 
South 
Korea Consumer, Non-cyclical 19/5/2006 25/5/2006 
Wuzhou Minovo Co Ltd China Industrial 19/4/2006 6/6/2006 
Amit Spinning Industries Ltd India Consumer, Cyclical 27/2/2006 27/2/2006 
HLH Group Ltd Singapore Financial 15/8/2001 16/8/2001 
Hire Intelligence International Ltd Australia Technology 20/6/2005 15/12/2005 
Vantage Corp Ltd Singapore Financial 11/7/2005 6/9/2005 
Quattor Petroquimica SA Brazil Basic Materials 16/8/2004 16/8/2004 
Curoholdings Co Ltd 
South 
Korea Technology 1/11/2007 5/11/2007 
Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial 
Group Co Ltd China Basic Materials 27/2/2006 14/4/2007 
Daiki Sound Co Ltd Japan Consumer, Cyclical 23/4/2007 13/6/2007 
Indian Sucrose Ltd India Consumer, Non-cyclical 28/3/2002 29/6/2002 
Testech Inc 
South 
Korea Technology 11/10/2007 11/10/2007 
Provita Corp 
South 
Korea Consumer, Cyclical 12/10/2007 12/10/2007 
Samyang Optics Co Ltd 
South 
Korea Industrial 17/10/2007 17/10/2007 
World Co Ltd Japan Consumer, Cyclical 25/7/2005 1/9/2005 
Guthrie GTS Ltd Singapore Industrial 9/1/2007 30/3/2007 
Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste SAB 
de CV Mexico Industrial 30/3/2007 20/6/2007 
Digital China Holdings Ltd China Consumer, Cyclical 8/8/2007 1/11/2007 
Discovery Holdings Ltd 
South 
Africa Financial 13/9/2007 19/11/2007 
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics 
 For Net Income, EBITDA, Total Assets, Total Liabilities and Capital 
Expenditures for 70 Management Buyouts Completed in the 1997-2007 Period 
(Euros in Millions) 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. Total N 
Panel A: Firm Three Years Before MBO 
Net Income 138.60 34.94 6,025 -8,641 1,407 8,593 62 
EBITDA 905.46 74.57 17,923 -2,787 2,984 52,517 58 
Total Assets 14,641 943.92 311,521 1.739 48,860 937,056 64 
Total Liabilities 9,317 455.97 265,412 1.999 37,357 596,314 64 
Capital Expenditures 500 34.79 13,935 0 2,135 29,999 60 
Panel B: Firm Two Years Before MBO 
Net Income -7.79 20.73 7,266 -13,425 2,145 -498.55 64 
EBITDA 1,037 67.34 21,953 -3,354 3,956 61,164 59 
Total Assets 15,831 1,030 299,472 0 50,942 1,044,856 66 
Total Liabilities 10,017 502.03 248,122 0,028 38,813 661,123 66 
Capital Expenditures 583.75 40.51 12,531 0 1,933 36,776 63 
Panel C: Firm One Year Before MBO 
Net Income -649.85 16.45 9,270 -27,707 4,256 -44,839 69 
EBITDA 1,078 43.50 23,563 -4,741 4,469 71,128 66 
Total Assets 17,486 1,058 329,253 0.065 55,165 1,224,041 70 
Total Liabilities 11,777 482.06 275,409 0.13 42.745 824,371 70 
Capital Expenditures 608.74 40.57 15,075 0 2,225 41,394 68 
Panel D: Firm One Year After MBO 
Net Income -1,387 2.84 15,685 -27,008 6,050 -95,689 69 
EBITDA 1,288 53.62 38,856 -6,621 6,777 83,720 65 
Total Assets 20,369 1,375 313,744 0.331 56,799 1,405,493 69 
Total Liabilities 14,351 1,037 214,758 0,132 43,628 990,231 69 
Capital Expenditures 543.23 33.20 18,611 0 2,332 37,483 69 
Panel E: Firm Two Years After MBO 
Net Income -1,913 0.95 20,006 -53,908 9,898 -105,240 55 
EBITDA 1,836 47.19 34,532 -3,908 6975 93,618 51 
Total Assets 23,627 1,307 316,446 0.177 63,026 1,299,483 55 
Total Liabilities 17,961 830.30 266,351 0.004 52.575 987,852 55 
Capital Expenditures 489.13 24.58 8,058 0 1,345 26,413 54 
Panel F: Firm Three Years After MBO 
Net Income -4,812 13.95 5,019 -88,088 17,666 -182,873 38 
EBITDA 1,154 47.61 29,055 -17,425 6,804 41,538 36 
Total Assets 25,211 1,171 231,817 0.165 60,284 957,999 38 
Total Liabilities 22,604 777.17 27,700 0,042 61,099 858,957 38 
Capital Expenditures 443.02 27.32 7,852 0 1,466 16,835 38 
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Table 9 Final Sample per Country 
Target Country Number of firms 
Australia 2 
Austria 1 
Bermuda 1 
Brazil 1 
China 3 
France 1 
Germany 5 
Hong Kong 2 
Hungary 1 
India 2 
Italy 1 
Japan 6 
Malaysia 1 
Philippines 1 
Poland 2 
Portugal 1 
Singapore 5 
South Africa 2 
South Korea 6 
Spain 1 
Thailand 1 
Turkey 1 
UK 2 
US 20 
Mexico 1 
Total 70 
 
 
65 
 
Table 10 Impact of MBOs on Profitability, Performance and Efficiency 
Indicators 
Mean and median raw and percentage changes in sixteen profitability indicators, for 70 
management buyouts completed between 1997 and 2007. Year -1 is the fiscal year 
preceding the completion of the buyout. Year +1 is the first full fiscal year following the 
completion of the buyout. Significance levels are based on two tailed t test for means (P- 
values are in parentheses) and the Mann Whitney/Wilcoxon test for medians (P- values are 
in brackets). 
Changes from Years Relative to Completion of MBO 
Profitability and Efficiency Measures -3 to -1 -2 to -1 -1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3 
A. ROE 
               Mean change -22.343* -88.665 23.741 -1.354 169.278 
 (0.079) (0.200) (0.529) (0.301) (0.214) 
               Mean percentage change -176% -177% 67% -442% 246% 
               Median change -3.382* -4.893* 0.884 -0.012 0.620 
                [0.054] [0.056] [0.880] [0.467] [0.988] 
               Median percentage change -36% -45% 15% -18% 10% 
               Number of observations 61 64 69 54 38 
B. ROA  
               Mean change -7.433** -4.759** 68.294 78.189 -0.979 
 (0.013) (0.044) (0.314) (0.315) (0.835) 
               Mean percentage change -191% -305% 89% 86% -29% 
               Median change -1.493** -0.602 -0.075 -0.302 -0.190 
 [0.043] [0.232] [0.845] [0.590] [0.488] 
               Median percentage change -39% -21% -5% -19% -15% 
               Number of observations 60 63 58 48 34 
C. ROC  
               Mean change -33.325 -4.523* 228.751 283.892 381.373 
 (0.187) (0.095) (0.243) (0.267) (0.268) 
               Mean percentage change -216% -42% 85% 101% 102% 
               Median change -2.363 -3.029 1.297 -0.978 0.011 
 [0.267] [0.150] [0.485] [0.959] [0.457] 
               Median percentage change -28% -30% 21% -17% 0.17% 
               Number of observations 36 38 25 24 18 
D. CFO/Sales 
               Mean change 53.146 -5.016  -15.098 3.654 1.562 
 (0.304) (0.335) (0.150) (0.651) (0.883) 
               Mean percentage change 113% -1% -318% 53% 17% 
               Median change -2.670 -1.287  1.746 1.040 -0.4937 
 [0.638] [0.299] [0.897] [0.528] [0.665] 
               Median percentage change -37% -3% 34% 20% -10% 
               Number of observations 61 63 67 53 37 
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E. ROCE 
               Mean change -12.577 -4.296  200.371 236.041 0.812 
 (0.162) (0.390) (0.247) (0.330) (0.928) 
               Mean percentage change -51% -23% 82% 99% 4% 
               Median change -4.084 -4.724 3.701 -0.163 6.971 
 [0.387] [0.133] [0.481] [0.744] [0.260] 
               Median percentage change -29% -28% 37% -2% 65% 
               Number of observations 32 36 21 21 14 
F. Asset Turnover 
               Mean change -0.084 -0.089* -0.315  -0.464* -0.588  
 (0.252) (0.059) (0.112) (0.084) (0.134) 
               Mean percentage change -7% -8% -25% -36% -44% 
               Median change -0.071 -0.069 -0.078 -0.096 -0.168 
 [0.671] [0.573] [0.724] [0.254] [0.196] 
               Median percentage change -8% -8% -10% -12% -20% 
               Number of observations 60 60 59 50 35 
 
G. Profit Margin 
               Mean change -30.528 24.743 -3.038 75.940 51.020 
 (0.576) (0.739) (0.951) (0.320) (0.563) 
               Mean percentage change -1005% 46% -11% 143% 64% 
               Median change -1.463 -1.230 -1.077 -1.772 -0.513 
                [0.272] [0.309] [0.407] [0.372] [0.873] 
               Median percentage change -37% -35% -44% -60% -24% 
               Number of observations 65 66 68 59 39 
H. EBIT 
               Mean change 107.361 61.871 -50.717 161.007 -1,090.070 
 (0.609) (0.596) (0.843) (0.280) (0.242) 
               Mean percentage change 21% 11% -8% 20% -89% 
               Median change -6.531 -5.111 -9.054 -11.636 -8.975 
 [0.344] [0.440] [0.648] [0.703] [0.389] 
               Median percentage change -18% -13% -30% -33% -22% 
               Number of observations 61 62 65 51 36 
I. EBITDA 
               Mean change 248.310 122.193 194.042 414.726 -757.686 
 (0.405) (0.391) (0.588) (0.177) (0.416) 
               Mean percentage change 27% 12% 18% 29% -40% 
               Median change -27.160 -17.115 9.007 2.576 -18.119 
 [0.468] [0.416] [0.981] [0.616] [0.454] 
               Median percentage change -36% -25% 20% 6% -28% 
               Number of observations 58 59 65 51 36 
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J. Capital Expenditures  
               Mean change 85.132** 5.016 -112.67 -212.525 -416.663 
 (0.028) (0.972) (0.339) (0.260) (0.102) 
               Mean percentage change 17% 1% -18% -30% -48% 
               Median change 7.857 1.287 -7.775 -18.191 8.032 
 [0.969] [0.853] [0.965] [0.757] [0.930] 
               Median percentage change 23% 3% -19% -49% 42% 
               Number of observations 60 63 67 53 38 
K. CAPEX/Assets 
               Mean change -1.785 -1.230 -1.125 -2.025** -2.082*** 
 (0.113) (0.132) (0.237) (0.030) (0.006) 
               Mean percentage change -29% -20% -23% -43% -49% 
               Median change -0.011 -0.823 0.270 -1.628** -1.742* 
 [0.430] [0.287] [0.446] [0.033] [0.070] 
               Median percentage change -0.36% -21% -10% -56% -51% 
               Number of observations 51 55 51 41 30 
L. CAPEX/Sales 
               Mean change 1.284 -2.322 -3.789 2.372 -2.577** 
 (0.603) (0.569) (0.109) (0.556) (0.014) 
               Mean percentage change 14% -18% -37% 31% -36% 
               Median change -1.292 -0.434 -0.991 -0.571 -1.309 
 [0.327] [0.476] [0.576] [0.499] [0.390] 
               Median percentage change -24% -10% -24% -19% -32% 
               Number of observations 54 56 60 46 33 
M. Sales Growth 
               Mean change 68.017 37.954 -61.008 -113.031 -85.581 
 (0.384) (0.612) (0.463) (0.185) (0.520) 
               Mean percentage change 512% 94% -61% -103% -64% 
               Median change -5.874 -7.281 8.793 1.691 -1.424 
                [0.181] [0.129] [0.432] [0.112] [0.554] 
               Median percentage change -59% -62% 211% 29% -45% 
               Number of observations 60 64 59 55 36 
N. Enterprise Value 
               Mean change 11,282** 3,905* -5,241 -5,648 -12,997 
 (0.046) (0.061) (0.292) (0.420) (0.212) 
               Mean percentage change 106% 23% -26% -24% -41% 
               Median change -74.727 -79.008 227.896 265.565 495.119 
 [0.640] [0.755] [0.812] [0.600] [0.949] 
               Median percentage change -7% -7% 30% 34% 99% 
               Number of observations 53 57 48 38 26 
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* Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O. R&D Expenditures/Sales 
               Mean change 0.122 0.372 0.991 -0.724 -0.218 
 (0.796) (0.145) (0.991) (0.657) (0.218) 
               Mean percentage change 4% 15% 33% -21% -7% 
               Median change -0.110 -0.075 -0.099 -0.070 0.047 
 [0.969] [0.931] [0.770] [0.878] [0.936] 
               Median percentage change -27% -33% -27% -100% 16% 
               Number of observations 25 27 19 13 6 
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Table 11 Impact of MBOs on Liquidity Indicators 
Mean and median raw and percentage changes in eight liquidity indicators, for 70 
management buyouts completed between 1997 and 2007. Year -1 is the fiscal year 
preceding the completion of the buyout. Year +1 is the first year following the completion 
of the buyout. Significance levels are based on two tailed t test for paired two sample for 
means  (P-values are in parentheses) and the Mann Whitney/Wilcoxon test for medians (P-
values are in brackets). 
 
Changes from Years Relative to Completion of MBO 
Liquidity  Measures -3 to -1 -2 to -1 -1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3 
A. Quick Ratio 
               Mean change 0.138 0.105 0.099 0.008 0.565 
 (0.245) (0.355) (0.742) (0.981) (0.250) 
               Mean percentage change 11% 8% 7% 1% 47% 
               Median change 0.116 0.015 -0.108 -0.068 -0.076 
                [0.557] [0.952] [0.481] [0.968] [0.944] 
               Median percentage change 13% 2% -11% -7% -8% 
               Number of observations 59 60 64 51 35 
B. Current Ratio   
               Mean change 0.093 0.055 0.079 -0.090 0.710 
 (0.695) (0.644) (0.829) (0.801) (0.175) 
               Mean percentage change 4% 3% 4% -4% 35% 
               Median change 0.158 0.019 -0.066 0.012 -0.160 
 [0.338] [0.935] [0.392] [0.718] [0.851] 
               Median percentage change 11% 1% -5% 1% -10% 
               Number of observations 59 60 64 51 35 
C. Inventory to Cash Days   
               Mean change -895.189 -10.456 -48.070 -64.360 -111.881 
 (0.296) (0.911) (0.435) (0.439) (0.306) 
               Mean percentage change -78% -4% -20% -24% -35% 
               Median change -7,481 -1,139 -5,528 2,119 -2,587 
 [0.714] [0.927] [0.840] [0.652] [0.960] 
               Median percentage change -6% -1% -5% 2% -2% 
               Number of observations 31 34 34 28 21 
D. Accounts Payable Turnover Days 
               Mean change -612.699 -18.049 573.290 -99.330 186.059 
 (0.304) (0.199) (0.307) (0.426) (0.268) 
               Mean percentage change -94% -33% 2250% -244% 515% 
               Median change -2.230 1.159 1.984 12.537 14.058 
 [0.363] [0.952] [0.611] [0.166] [0.130] 
               Median percentage change -6% 3% 6% 34% 39% 
               Number of observations 38 39 37 29 37 
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* Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
 
 
 
E. Cash Ratio 
               Mean change 0.019 0.021 0.298 0.236 0.674 
 (0.900) (0.863) (0.270) (0.414) (0.145) 
               Mean percentage change 3% 4% 49% 37% 115% 
               Median change 0.108 -0.004 -0.114 -0.018 0.108 
 [0.373] [0.881] [0.858] [0.904] [0.459] 
               Median percentage change 41% -1% -31% -5% 29% 
               Number of observations 58 60 64 51 35 
F. Working Capital Ratio 
               Mean change -0.013 -0.105 -0.079 0.053 -0.251 
 (0.820) (0.237) (0.332) (0.562) (0.506) 
               Mean percentage change -9% -82% -365% 3235% -222% 
               Median change 0.040 -0.020 -0.042 -0.034 -0.009 
 [0.375] [0.977] [0.276] [0.309] [0.991] 
               Median percentage change 35% -12% -31% -22% -6% 
               Number of observations 59 60 64 51 35 
G. Cash and Cash Equivalents to Current Assets 
               Mean change 4.095* 2.337 -1.862 0.078 5.349 
 (0.072) (0.342) (0.460) (0.980) (0.278) 
               Mean percentage change 13% 7% -5% 0.2% 16% 
               Median change 7.672 2.088 -5.262 -5.651 3.221 
 [0.349] [0.583] [0.598] [0.855] [0.541] 
               Median percentage change 29% 7% -15% -16% 9% 
               Number of observations 58 59 63 50 35 
H. Cash to Total Assets 
               Mean change 0.933 0.92 -0.710 -0.089 4.098 
 (0.365) (0.923) (0.594) (0.960) (0.219) 
               Mean percentage change 8% 1% -5% -1% 30% 
               Median change 2.855 1.693 0.365 -0.282 1.567 
 [0.615] [0.970] [0.947] [0.926] [0.374] 
               Median percentage change 45% 24% 4% -3% 17% 
               Number of observations 63 65 69 55 38 
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Table 12 Impact of MBOs on Leverage and Solvency Indicators 
Mean and median raw and percentage changes in nine leverage and solvency indicators, for 
70 management buyouts completed between 1997 and 2007. Year -1 is the fiscal year 
preceding the completion of the buyout. Year +1 is the first full fiscal year  following the 
completion of the buyout . Significance levels are based on two tailed t test for paired two 
samples for means (P- values are in parentheses) and the Mann Whitney/Wilcoxon test for 
medians (P- values are in brackets). 
Changes from Years Relative to Completion of MBO 
Leverage and Solvency Measures -3 to -1 -2 to -1 -1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3 
A. Total Debt 
               Mean change 2,422* 1,769* 1,408 2,989 2,778 
 (0.085) (0.056) (0.541) (0.199) (0.389) 
               Mean percentage change 45% 29% 19% 34% 23% 
               Median change 60.355 -7.484 178.746 245.304 343.618 
                [0.514] [0.625] [0.501] [0.489] [0.754] 
               Median percentage change 37% -4% 90% 110% 173% 
               Number of observations 62 64 68 54 37 
B. Debt to Equity 
               Mean change 33.470** 24.289** 50.606 455.397 123.671 
 (0.034) (0.022) (0.171) (0.224) (0.190) 
               Mean percentage change 36% 23% 41% 393% 101% 
               Median change 2.244 7.266 7.011 25.295 29.773 
 [0.642] [0.431] [0.518] [0.356] [0.634] 
               Median percentage change 4% 16% 12% 40% 41% 
               Number of observations 57 58 59 49 32 
C. Gearing Ratio 
               Mean change 0.003 0.033** 0.097** 0.077*** 0.088* 
 (0.909) (0.047) (0.023) (0.010) (0.092) 
               Mean percentage change 1% 11% 33% 28% 27% 
               Median change 0.024 0.027 0.068 0.119 -0.017 
 [0.918] [0.513] [0.240] [0.2812] [0.585] 
               Median percentage change 10% 12% 29% 55% -6% 
               Number of observations 64 65 64 51 34 
D. Total Debt to Capital 
               Mean change 0.900 28.118 11.835*** 29.784 2.973 
 (0.728) (0.438) (0.006) (0.151) (0.536) 
               Mean percentage change 2% 485% 35% 91% 7% 
               Median change 0.552 3.212 11.326 8.289 1.681 
 [0.809] [0.678] [0.2079] [0.265] [0.915] 
               Median percentage change 2% 10% 31% 21% 4% 
               Number of observations 62 63 67 54 36 
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E. Long Term Debt to Capital 
               Mean change 1.328 2.882** 6.247* 7.590** 9.059** 
 (0.576) (0.029) (0.056) (0.012) (0.034) 
               Mean percentage change 6% 14% 28% 33% 35% 
               Median change 2.131 5.127 1.920 7.872 9.675 
 [0.666] [0.499] [0.404] [0.365] [0.503] 
               Median percentage change 18% 60% 14% 53% 51% 
               Number of observations 62 63 66 54 36 
F. Total Debt to Assets 
               Mean change 1.780 6.270 2.952 -0.782 3.198 
 (0.407) (0.121) (0.333) (0.887) (0.307) 
               Mean percentage change 7% 24% 9% -2% 11% 
               Median change 4.382 3.828 5.073 2.052** -0.969 
 [0.700] [0.542] [0.397] [0.027] [0.767] 
               Median percentage change 20% 16% 18% 7% -3% 
               Number of observations 64 65 69 55 38 
G. Long Term Debt to Assets 
               Mean change 1.702 2.451** 3.750 4.619** 6.075* 
 (0.309) (0.029) (0.114) (0.039) (0.055) 
               Mean percentage change 10% 15% 22% 27% 32% 
               Median change 0.717 3.889 0.278 1.846 5.911 
                [0.508] [0.437] [0.513] [0.521] [0.539] 
               Median percentage change 9% 76% 3% 19% 46% 
               Number of observations 62 62 67 54 36 
H. Interest Coverage Ratio 
               Mean change -239.032 -17.909 -9.628 -32.778 -51.147 
 (0.164) (0.441) (0.802) (0.599) (0.428) 
               Mean percentage change -81% -43% -25% -45% -75% 
               Median change -0.408 -0.497 -1.431 -1.641 -1.652 
 [0.562] [0.382] [0.199] [0.250] [0.191] 
               Median percentage change -13% -16% -56% -49% -48% 
               Number of observations 55 52 56 41 30 
* Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
I. EBITDA to Total Interest Expense 
               Mean change -193.236 80.972 -96.315 -128.754 -57.581 
 (0.350) (0.398) (0.368) (0.352) (0.385) 
               Mean percentage change -54% 164% -60% -56% -41% 
               Median change 0.352 0.114 -2.866** -2.541 -3.045* 
 [0.995] [0.935] [0.047] [0.134] [0.059] 
               Median percentage change 7% 2% -59% -43% -48% 
               Number of observations 53 52 57 42 30 
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Table 13 Impact of MBOs on Investment Indicators 
Mean and median raw and percentage changes in five investment indicators, for 70 
management buyouts completed between 1997 and 2007. Year -1 is the fiscal year 
preceding the completion of the buyout. Year +1 is the first full fiscal year following the 
completion of the buyout. Significance levels are based on two tailed t test for paired two 
sample for means (P- values are in parentheses)  and the Mann Whitney/Wilcoxon test for 
medians (P- values are in brackets). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changes from Years Relative to Completion of MBO 
Investment   Measures -3 to -1 -2 to -1 -1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3 
A. Dividends Paid 
               Mean change 42.467** -2.475 -33.147 28.388 83.580 
 (0.019) (0.933) (0.385) (0.646) (0.144) 
               Mean percentage change 87% -3% -34% 29% 80% 
               Median change 2.802 -2.362 -4.248 -3.299 0.951 
                [0.296] [0.845] [0.209] [0.637] [0.733] 
               Median percentage change 1096% -80% -100% -90% 162% 
               Number of observations 55 57 59 48 35 
B. Dividend Yield 
               Mean change -0.435** -0.125 1.337 1.709 -0.052 
 (0.046) (0.345) (0.124) (0.234) (0.901) 
               Mean percentage change -30% -12% 136% 150% -4% 
               Median change -0.379 -0.315 0.227 -0.506 -0.432 
 [0.333] [0.753] [0.522] [0.956] [0.651] 
               Median percentage change -58% -60% 220% -94% -53% 
               Number of observations 48 51 42 34 21 
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* Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. DVD Payout Ratio 
               Mean change 4.209 18.445 4.397 477.406 -25.580 
 (0.365) (0.538) (0.854) (0.332) (0.260) 
               Mean percentage change 15% 42% 10% 5395% -46% 
               Median change 3.080 1.060 -6.173 3.625 -4.950 
 [0.778] [0.820] [0.915] [0.581] [0.678] 
               Median percentage change 15% 5% -18% 12% -14% 
               Number of observations 33 37 25 22 15 
D. Dividend Coverage 
               Mean change -1.276 -0.328 -0.332 -0.762 -0.007 
 (0.439) (0.615) (0.844) (0.168) (0.993) 
               Mean percentage change -25% -8% -13% -24% -0.23% 
               Median change -0.190 0.154 -0.048 0.075 0.097 
 [0.829] [0.907] [0.605] [0.678] [0.791] 
               Median percentage change -6% 6% -2% 3% 4% 
               Number of observations 24 25 17 15 10 
E. Price to Book Ratio 
               Mean change -0.293 632.825 21,332 -22,302 -33,836 
 (0.391) (0.322) (0.323) (0.323) (0.326) 
               Mean percentage change -13% 4% -100% -100% -100% 
               Median change -0.004 -0.172 0.212 0.309 0.620 
 [0.909] [0.698] [0.806] [0.631] [0.351] 
               Median percentage change -0.32% -13% 20% 27% 50% 
               Number of observations 51 55 46 44 29 
Table 14 Summary of Studies of Changes in Firm Operations after Buyouts 
Notes: NA means medians statistic not available or not computed.  
              * Mean statistics are reported.  
 
Variable 
This 
Study Guo  et al. Weir  et al. 
Desbrierers 
&  
Schatt* Opler Kaplan 
Kaplan & 
Stein Kitching 
Long & 
Ravenscraft 
Muscarella 
& 
Vetsuypens Smith 
Operating cash flow/ sales -10% NA NA NA 16.6% 11.9% 12.1% 55% 9% 23.5% NA 
R&D/sales 16% NA NA NA -7.2% NA NA NA NA NA -7.4% 
Capital expenditures -28% NA NA NA -28.1% -21.4% NA NA NA NA NA 
Capital expenditures/sales -32% NA NA NA -42.2% -31.6% NA NA NA NA -0.2% 
Capital 
expenditures/assets 
-51% NA NA NA NA -25.4% NA NA NA NA NA 
Accounts payable 
turnover days 
39% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 297% 
Operating Income (EBIT) -22% NA NA NA NA 30.7% NA NA NA NA NA 
ROCE 65% NA -47% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
ROE 10% NA -58% 0.07% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
EBITDA -28% NA -55% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Asset turnover -20% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -3.05% NA 
EBITDA  margin -112% -8.89% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Total Debt/total assets 11%* NA NA 15.80% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Current Ratio 35%* NA NA -13.80% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Quick Ratio 47%* NA NA -22.90% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Time period 1997-07 1990-06 1998-04 1988-94 1985-89 1980-86 1980-89 1980-87 1981-87 1976-87 1977-86 
Number of Buyouts 38 48 113 161 42 37 66 110 198 35 37 
Window (-1,+3) (-1,+3) (-1,+5) (-1,+2) (-1,+2) (-1,+2) (-1,+2) (0,+3) (-1,+1) Variable (-1,+2) 
